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THE NEW REPUBLIC

A Journal of Opinion

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Recall Robert Murphy!

THE PEYROUTON SCANDAL is nearing a climax. Paul Appleby, special assistant to Secretary Hull and an outstanding American progressive, has resigned his post in protest against the Peyrouton appointment. The British press is outspoken in its condemnation, and the British government conceals its dismay with difficulty. Miss Helen Kirkpatrick, a reliable newspaper correspondent, in a cable from London published in The New York Post, says that nothing in our history has so shocked and disheartened the democratic peoples of Europe as our North African policy, of which the Peyrouton deal is the latest chapter. We would know more about this situation if the State Department had not ordered the censorship to suppress about 80 percent of the hostile criticism from Great Britain, just as it has managed to prevent our knowing of the public reaction in North Africa. The sharp contrast between the fine and brave words of Roosevelt and Churchill about the meaning and purpose of the war, and the sordid intriguing with the fascists in North Africa needs no underlining by anybody.

The point to remember about Peyrouton is that he has been pro-Nazi from beginning to end. He quarreled with Laval, it is true; but his quarrel was a matter of personal ambition, not of opposition to Laval's licking Hitler's boots. In 1940, Peyrouton proudly told representatives of Transocean, the Nazi news agency, that he had introduced Nazi methods into North Africa, and this boast was true. He built the first concentration camp on French soil. He is a bitter anti-Semite and enemy of Freemasonry. He forbade trade-union activity during his short career as governor of Tunisia (contrary to his defenders, he is not an experienced colonial administrator, having held his various posts only for brief periods). When France surrendered to Germany, Peyrouton went to North Africa to make sure that that area did not continue to fight. He mistreated the Arabs, who hate him. As Minister of the Interior at Vichy under Pétain, he persecuted de Gaullists with the utmost vigor, arresting thousands. He also arrested such French patriots as former Premiers Reynaud and Blum and former Colonial Minister Georges Mandel, on the ground of seeking to continue the fight against Hitler.

Peyrouton revealed his true sentiments when he visited Balbo in Libya and paid a glowing tribute to Italian fascism, as well as when he said that "only a madman can believe the British will win this war." In short, this man is and has been a traitor to France and a supporter of Hitler, from first to last. If we can make a deal with him, we might just as well make a deal with Hitler himself.

The State Department defense of Peyrouton is in several mutually contradictory parts. First of all, an official spokesman tried to deny all responsibility, saying that Peyrouton's selection was done by the War Department. But this is simply not true. It is refuted by Paul Appleby's resignation, and by other facts. We have good reason for saying that from first to last, the army and the Office of War Information have been consistently far better than the State Department on this whole matter. The War Department supported Paul Appleby and his point of view against the State Department. The selection of Peyrouton was forced

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by Robert Murphy, United States Minister to North Africa, and there is evidence that General Eisenhower was dubious, to say the least, about it. He has been advised by anti-Vichy French journalists and by his brother, Milton Eisenhower, who is second in command to Elmer Davis in the OWI. Davis certainly knows a fascist from a democrat, by smell, at a hundred yards. Coöperating with Murphy in putting through Peyrouton were James Clement Dunn, adviser on political relations for Europe; Ray Atherton, acting chief of the division of European Affairs; and Wallace Murray, adviser on political relations for the Near East. A. A. Berle Jr., Assistant Secretary of State, collaborated with these men. Sumner Welles OK'd the plan, somewhat reluctantly, and Secretary Hull was never fully informed about its significance.

The second explanation offered by the Department is even weirder than the first. It is that we are not occupying North Africa, but simply passing through on our way to Tunisia, and therefore must keep out of domestic affairs. This story is an insult to about one thousand American boys who were killed or are missing in landings in this "friendly country." Moreover, the State Department repeatedly contradicts this theory by announcing over and over that, with our help, political matters are about to be all right in North Africa.

Secretary Hull angrily demanded a few days ago that Americans stop paying attention to French politics in North Africa and pay some attention to the war. Unfortunately, the bungling, incompetent, but extremely severe American censorship in North Africa makes it almost impossible to find out what is going on in relation to the war. But aside from that, Secretary Hull is completely wrong. French politics in North Africa *is* the war. How can you fight unless you are able to tell your friends from your enemies, collaborate with the former and fight the latter? Most Americans are not disturbed over the fact that in the first few days in North Africa General Eisenhower accepted the help of anybody he could get. They are disturbed because even today, three months later, important people in the American government don't see any real difference between a fascist and a democrat; don't see any ideological basis for this war; collaborate by deliberate choice with an unrepentant anti-Semite, anti-laborite and admirer of Hitler.

The key figure in this policy of collaboration with the fascists is Robert Murphy, whose record contains several things that badly need explaining. One of them is the turning back of the Morocco radio to the Vichyites after it had been seized by the Americans. Many people here wondered why this radio was permitted for weeks to go on pouring out anti-American, pro-Vichy, pro-Nazi material, until Elmer Davis had to warn the country that it was completely unreliable. The answer is that after we had seized the radio and were prepared to use it, Robert Murphy demanded it should be turned back to the Vichyites for their use. He said Admiral Darlan was insisting on this, but Darlan himself afterward denied that this was true. Murphy, it is well known, is a fanatic admirer of Pétain, a fanatic supporter of the Vichy collaborationist government. It is his business to know the ins and outs of French politics as it is not the business of General Eisenhower. If General Giraud asked for Peyrouton, it was Murphy's business to refuse the request and to explain to General Eisenhower, if necessary, why this request must be refused. The fact that Peyrouton is in Algiers is a damning and ineradicable blot on Murphy's career. Whatever else may be true of him, he has ended his usefulness in North Africa. For the sake of American prestige throughout the world, for the sake of our British and European and other allies, who thought we were fighting the fascists not making love to them, Murphy should be recalled.

Uncle Sam and Uncle Shylock

While the reactionary die-hards who oppose lease-lend have apparently dropped their plans to repeal the law during the war, their sniping campaign against it continues, aided and abetted by rumors which are almost certainly Axis-inspired. The rumors attribute current shortages, particularly of foodstuffs, to "extravagant" lease-lend shipments. Actually we have shipped less than one percent of our butter, less than four percent of our sugar, one-tenth of one percent of our beef, less than three percent of our canned vegetables, less than one-half of one percent of our coffee, and only one percent of our eggs on lease-lend orders.

Nor is lease-lend by any means all one way. As Lease-Lend Administrator Edward R. Stettinius has pointed out, our forces in the British Isles received from our allies between May and November of last year supplies which would have used 1,200,000 ship tons if shipped from the United States, and we are shipping almost no food to our forces in the South and Southwest Pacific today because Australia and New Zealand are lease-lending them all they need.

But what is most disturbing is not so much the specific criticisms of lease-lend as the attitude of mind they reflect. Does that attitude presage a return to the narrow view of the obligations growing out of a great war which was so well expressed by Calvin Coolidge when he said of the war debts, "Well, they hired the money, didn't they?" If it does, we may as well abandon hope of a free and peaceful world emerging from this conflict. For unless the American people, and their representatives in Congress, come to realize that we, and our allies, have undertaken unlimited, worldwide obligations, from which we cannot retreat even after the fighting is over, and for which we cannot conceivably ever present the bills, those peoples less fortunate than we will envy us our riches and bitterly resent our selfishness, and, absorbed in quarrels among ourselves, we

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shall quickly lose the position of world leadership we have gained. Uncle Sam must not become Uncle Shylock.

Our Spanish Prisoners

Most of the Fighting Frenchmen who were imprisoned in North Africa have now been released, but thousands of other anti-Nazis are still being held. Among them are veterans of the International Brigades and Spaniards who committed the unspeakable crime of serving in the Loyalist army. Anthony Eden told Parliament on January 20 that 200 Poles, 100 Russians and a few Czechs and Belgians from the International Brigades were prisoners in Algeria. His statement did not cover the big prison camps in Morocco, and it did not even mention the Spanish Republicans. Thirty thousand of these, counting women and children, had been shipped to North Africa, although their number was afterwards reduced, and is still being reduced, by overwork, undernourishment, typhus and scurvy. A very few of them have escaped, to describe their life in a man-made hell. To the best of our knowledge, not a single one of them has been set free.

It is no use saying that the atrocious treatment they received is the fault of the Vichy regime. We have not heard that the present government in North Africa is treating them any better, and in fact—except for their still being prisoners—we have heard nothing at all. When American forces occupied North Africa, we accepted a responsibility that cannot be avoided. It is the fault of our own government that the survivors of those thirty thousand Spaniards—the best soldiers for democracy in Europe—are still being confined in their unspeakable labor camps. Our government—and no other—is morally accountable for every one of them who dies from mistreatment or filth-borne diseases. We can either have them released immediately, or else acknowledge ourselves as the accomplices and protectors of the fascists who are still betraying France.

Hate Can't Be Made to Order

We remember a cartoon from Punch, published early in the last war, which showed a big German family having its morning hate. And we remember the famous "Hymn of Hate" against England that was written by Ernst Lissauer—who, if we are not mistaken, afterwards turned out to be a Jew, and hence a member of the Anglo-Judeo-plutocratic-communist world conspiracy against the spotless Teutonic race. All that happened a long time ago. Today Rex Stout, whom we love like a brother, and several other writers are advising us to follow the former German example by hating Germans all day long.

If we were soldiers fighting at the front, along roads bombed and machine-gunned by German planes, we shouldn't have any trouble following Mr. Stout's advice—but then we shouldn't need it. The Poles don't need it when their families are torn apart, their daughters sent to Nazi houses of prostitution and their sons machine-gunned for daring to protest. The Russians don't need it when their villages are burned and even the children hanged from baby-sized gallows—we have seen the horrible photographs—on suspicion of having helped the Partisans. Hate comes naturally to the Russians, the Poles, the Norwegians and the Jews of all nations. We Americans hate the Germans too—or rather we loathe and utterly despise the Nazis—when we think of their crimes. But to spend our days in nursing a systematic hatred is something we do not propose to do. Artificial hatred is even more dangerous than the other synthetic emotions. It doesn't last forever, and Ernst Lissauer was not the first to discover that some day it produces a worse hangover than synthetic gin. What Americans need to make them work and fight harder in these days is not hatred of the Germans but even more love for their own country.

India's Declaration of Independence

On January 26 of each year, the Indian Nationalists renew their pledge to seek independence, a pledge first adopted on December 31, 1929, and slightly modified as to text on a later date. It is an interesting document, not very well known in the United States, and we take pleasure in reprinting it herewith:

We believe that it is the inalienable right of the Indian people as of any other people to have freedom and to enjoy the fruits of their toil and have the necessities of life so that they may have full opportunities of growth. We believe

Duffy in The Baltimore Sun

"Nothing That Would Interest You"

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also that if any government deprives a people of these rights and oppresses them, the people have a further right to alter it or to abolish it. The British government in India has not only deprived the Indian people of their freedom but has ruined India economically, politically, culturally and spiritually. We believe therefore that India must sever the British connection and obtain Purna Swaraj, or Complete Independence.

We recognize that the most effective way of gaining our freedom is not through violence. India has gained strength and self-reliance and marched a long way to Swaraj following peaceful and legitimate methods, and it is by adhering to these methods that our country will attain independence.

We pledge ourselves anew to the Independence of India and solemnly resolve to carry on non-violently the struggle for freedom till Purna Swaraj is attained.

We believe that non-violent action in general and preparation for non-violent direct action in particular require successful working of the constructive program of khadi (weaving), communal harmony and removal of untouchability. We shall seek every opportunity of spreading good will among fellow men without distinction of caste or creed. We shall endeavor to raise from ignorance and poverty those who have been neglected and to advance in every way those who are considered to be backward or suppressed. We know that though we are out to destroy the imperialistic system, we have no quarrel with Englishmen, whether officials or non-officials. We know that the distinction between caste Hindus and Harijans (Untouchables) must be abolished, and Hindus have to forget these distinctions in their daily conduct. Such distinctions are a bar to non-violent conduct. Though our religious faiths may be different, in our mutual relations we will act as children of Mother India, bound by common nationality and common political and economic interest.

Charka (spinning-wheel) and khadi (hand-woven homespun cloth) are integral parts of our constructive program for the rehabilitation of the 700,000 villages of India and for the removal of the grinding poverty of the masses. We shall, therefore, spin regularly and use for our personal requirements nothing but khadi, and as far as possible products of the village handicrafts only, and endeavor to make others do likewise. We pledge ourselves to the disciplined observance of Congress principles and policies and to keep in readiness to respond to the call of the Congress whenever it may come for carrying on the struggle for the Independence of India.

The Christian Americans in Tennessee

A dangerous group of American protofascists is the Christian Americans, whose general policies are very like those of the Ku Klux Klan and therefore pretty poor Christianity and pretty poor Americanism. In The New Republic of January 25, Helen Fuller told the story of some of their recent activities in Alabama, Louisiana and Texas. We regret to report that they have now moved in on Tennessee as well. When the new session of the Tennessee legislature convened a few days ago, every member found on his desk a leaflet describing the Christian Americans, and a copy of the O'Daniel plan, which is anti-labor and would limit the taxing power of the federal government to a crippling extent. The Christian Americans are working the same ground as the Ku Klux Klan, and sowing the same kind of poisonous seed.

The School for Scandal

Alert Americans were given an interesting lesson in the technique of labor-baiting last week when The Akron, Ohio, Beacon Journal came out with the story, which it attributed to six unnamed veterans, that ailing Marines had been obliged to unload their own supplies when the crew of a merchant vessel lying off Guadalcanal Island refused to work on Sunday. The paper attributed the crew's action to a National Maritime Union rule prohibiting Sunday work and said that one of its sources had termed the incident "the worst scandal of the war." Its three-column head read "Union Crew on Holiday; Ill Marines Unload Ships."

Lt.-Col. Lewis B. Fuller of the Marine Corps, himself a wounded Guadalcanal veteran, promptly denied the report, explaining that "all the ships are unloaded as a matter of routine by the soldiers, sailors and marines" because there are no civilians or stevedores on the island and the crews are too small to do the work unaided. "I'm sure that couldn't have happened on Guadalcanal," he said emphatically.

Joseph Curran, president of the NMU, denounced the yarn as a piece of "Hitler's work in America" and stated that nothing in the union's agreements with the shipping companies or its own regulations prohibited Sunday work. On the contrary, he said, ship's articles invariably provide for "work at the discretion of the master," Sundays and holidays included.

Yet neither denial prevented our habitual labor-baiters from seizing on the story and playing it up. It appeared in The New York Journal-American, The Chicago Tribune and The Washington Times-Herald, along with outraged comments by Sen. Millard Tydings and Reps. Howard Smith, Clare Hoffman and Carl Vinson. The denials, of course, were ignored.

How proud Dr. Goebbels must be of his diligent American students!

The Coal Strike

The strike of the United Mine Workers in the anthracite-coal fields has been ended, but there were two fundamental conditions which caused the strike to go on. The first was the fact that the rank and file hates and fears John L. Lewis, the union president. Lewis has been its dictator for twenty-five years, manipulating an executive board and a corps of local officers which consists largely of dummy officials handpicked by Lewis and depending on him for their salaries. He has used goon squads to crush every show of rebelliousness. A number of his opponents have been killed and many

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beaten and slugged. The anthracite strike hurt the war effort and was the worst possible way to get at Lewis, but the workers took it because it gave them safety in numbers. There is a better way to throw Lewis out. A trusted leader like Phil Murray could start a new organization and the rank and file could invoke the Wagner Act to reject Lewis and the union he made into a machine for his personal ambitions and hatreds.

A second cause of this strike was the long industrial tradition of regarding organized labor not as decent American workmen—no better or no worse than any others—joined together for their legitimate interests, but as trouble-makers, agitators, revolutionaries, anarchists and all the other epithets that have become common usage in the long propaganda war against labor. This psychological warfare has seeped inevitably into the workers themselves, and unconsciously many of them regard themselves as somehow cut off from the national community—unloved and unwanted.

The Labor-Extension Service

Now that the President has ordered the dissolution of the WPA, what is to become of its much-kicked-around Workers' Service Program, which is now so much more important than ever before? The new responsibilities which the organized-labor movement has been given recently create an urgent need for a broad program of education and information among all union members. They need to know the facts about labor laws affecting war industries; they need more background in labor relations, more understanding of the labor-management-committee plan and of the wide variety of problems involved in trade-union organization.

The WPA Workers' Service Program has plugged away at providing specifically this kind of broad educational program for labor ever since it was established as one of the earliest New Deal projects. It was always starved for funds and personnel and even the barest necessities of physical equipment, but in spite of all obstacles the director, Miss Hilda Smith, and her amazing staff built a sound foundation for the greatly expanded federal program for workers' education which must surely come. Miss Smith's field people all over the country took on the job of acquainting workers with the facts about health and safety, civilian defense, housing and consumer problems related to rationing and price control. This beginning must not be dissipated in the course of the general dismantling of the WPA. By rights, workers' education should be carried on through the Department of Labor, and this is a good time to bring about that logical relocation. Perhaps Labor Extension Service would be a good title for the new program, since it would perform for labor a service parallel to that which the Agricultural Extension Service has so long performed for farmers.

The Big Job of Relief

There has been a good deal of discussion lately about whether it will be up to the United States to set Europe on its feet again after the war. A common observation of conservatives is that while it is all right to feed the hungry for a limited period, this country must think of itself first and should take no responsibility beyond that. We suggest that no one is qualified to understand the subject until he has read the excellent pamphlet, "Relief for Europe," published by the National Planning Association. This is not just one writer's opinion, but the result of months of study by a group of qualified experts.

In no country of Europe, with the possible exception of Portugal, are the people getting as much to eat as before the war. Only in Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Eire, Denmark and Germany is there even an approximation of an adequate diet. The need will be so great, not merely for food, but for clothing, shelter, drugs, doctors, fertilizers, agricultural implements and many other things that the United States alone cannot hope to supply more than a fraction of it. Indeed, the mere gift of supplies, though important, will be far from sufficient. Skilled administration and the stimulation of production must be begun at the earliest possible moment in countries suffering from huge forced migrations, lack of political or social organization, undernourishment and epidemic disease. This is not a job for private charity, and not one for a single nation. It must be organized internationally, on the basis of careful planning and the training of the thousands who will be required to administer it. No artificial boundary can be drawn between relief and reconstruction, and there is no time to be lost in making the necessary preparations.

Woollcott

Alexander Woollcott was in his best if not most notable role, a town crier against fascism, when he suffered his fatal heart attack in a radio studio. A genial middleman of the arts who created and exploited many a lesser role, he was always at his best when he spoke out against tyranny, or in behalf of various services of human kindness. Though he became the Dr. Johnson of the horsey set in the theatre and the arts, he did have his roots in a now vanished tradition of utopian fellowship, as he was born in a utopian phalanstery. It was here that he learned to withdraw from a radio contract rather than withdraw his criticism of fascism. For the rest, he will be remembered for playing the original, baroque and sometimes exasperating role of Alexander Woollcott; Sheridan Whiteside was only a pale copy. He was the symbol of easy glitter on our culture, as he brought that glitter, and its accompanying gossip, to the American hearth, conferring pleasure upon millions and his Midas touch on

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occasional publishers. Yet it was only in little matters, like taste, that his integrity was not of the fiercest; and he exploited nothing as he did himself.

One War, One Future

THE DREAM of a Supreme War Council for the United Nations may well be on the way toward becoming a reality. There have been significant newspaper reports from both Washington and London, cryptic hints from Secretary Hull, whisperings and rustlings of all sorts, all of them indicating that something is brewing in the United Nations' pot. If these rumors are true, as we trust they are—that representatives of America, Britain, China and Russia are now in London forming a Supreme War Council of the ABCR nations—then it is an event of the first importance, comparable in its consequences to such turning-points in the war as the successful resistance of England and then Russia and the American invasion of Africa.

The editors of The New Republic have said ever since America's entrance into the war, and often to the point of wearisome repetition, that this would not be a real coalition war until we had evolved a grand strategy and formed a unified command with our allies. We have always known that it is not an easy thing to do. Every war machine tends to be, at best, a self-contained unit, with its own tradition and organization—if it is not itself split into autonomous fragments, each going its own way. The most we have achieved so far in undoing this separateness has been to hold conversations between political leaders and between chiefs of staff, and to form combined commands in particular areas and on particular problems.

But this has not been enough. And the same harsh demands of a global and total war which have driven us so far on the road to unification seem now to be driving us farther. Despite the fact that the Nazis and the Japanese are on the defensive on all fronts, there are still unsolved problems which are goading us into greater unity. One is the submarine war, which we discuss elsewhere in this issue. A second is the stalemate in China, the departure from this country of the Chinese military mission, the continued and unresolved tensions in India. A third is the bogging down of the campaign in Tunisia, and the approaching event of the joining of forces of two German armies of 150,000 men in that area. A fourth, and the most important, is the problem of political warfare—bungled thus far, as witness the messy situation in North Africa, in Yugoslavia, in Spain and Portugal.

And yet we can say that if a Supreme War Council is being created, it is being created out of strength rather than out of weakness. Trials and problems do not of themselves produce unity. Even more important is the fact that the ABCR nations have each shown their mettle and their stamina in winning victories. This provides the plane of equality and of mutual respect without which a Supreme War Council would be a mockery. Until Britain showed her capacity to win victories as well as retreats in North Africa, until Russia showed that she could organize successful offensives as well as heroic resistance, until America showed in the Pacific and in North Africa that she could fight as well as produce, the full conditions for a unified command did not exist. Now that we are poised for the greatest test of our strength—a breaching from several directions of the Nazi fortress in Europe—the unified command becomes an imperative.

Its tasks are clear and comprehensive. They must cover the four great phases of a coalition war—production, allocation of resources and manpower, strategy, political warfare. These must be welded into one war. This does not mean any change in the essential strategy of the war. It means a simpler and firmer method for arriving at that strategy and for translating it into effective results.

That, in turn, involves certain basic principles. One is concentration of decision. The ultimate decisions for the war as a whole must be made by the political leaders of the United Nations, either directly in council or through their representatives. But in every great theatre of the war—Europe, Russia, Asia—the power of decision must be concentrated in one man. The second principle is concentration of responsibility. The third is joint participation.

There can be no question that the United Nations will continue to pursue their broad strategy of smashing the Nazi military power first, before they turn to an all-out assault on Japan. This involves hardship for the Chinese. Yet it is a hardship which the Chinese will be willing and able to bear if it comes from a decision which they themselves have had a share in reaching. What we do not want is the inter-Allied pressure politics which results from what is an impossible position both for us and the Chinese: that we should be the nation that has to decide whether or not to grant aid, and that the Chinese should be the nation that has alternately to plead and threaten. In the case of Russia, there are problems of political confidence on both sides. Some of our leaders fear that Russia will bolshevize Europe. The Russians mistrust the capacity of a democracy to keep military secrets, and have not let us fully into their confidence on questions of their strength or weakness. This too can be resolved only by the joint participation of Russia as well as of America and England, in the forming of the grand military and political strategy of the war.

Of all the problems, the political will no doubt prove the most difficult. Upon what the United Nations do in this period of the war will depend the whole future of a democratic organization of the world. Ours is one war and one future.

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To Block the Submarine

THE AMERICAN CENSORSHIP, which has made many mistakes, has never made a worse one than in concealing submarine losses during the past year. In theory the censorship hides only information which it believes will be of value to the enemy; but in fact, it suppresses information well known to the enemy but which might "hurt the morale" of the American people. It is true that the Germans don't always know how successful they have been in their torpedo attacks; but they know 85 or 90 percent of the time, and there is therefore no good reason why the public should not be informed of 85 or 90 percent of the truth. If our morale were so fragile that facing the grim facts would cause us to give up in despair, we would be unlikely to have the stamina to win the war. But in fact, American morale is excellent; the timidity is largely confined to the men in Washington who don't trust the American people.

Despite the censorship, however, the general situation is fairly clear, and it is ominous in the extreme. The Germans are sinking just about as many ships as the United Nations are building, namely four or five a day, though the ships sunk are on the average smaller than the ships being built. The loss of these vessels is serious, but the loss of their cargoes and part or all of their trained personnel is often far more so. Hitler on the other hand is building twenty to thirty submarines a month, or about twice as many as we are sinking. They use a new and deadly form of attack, fighting not merely in packs but in groups of packs, so that a convoy of ships may have to fight a continuous running battle for several days and nights. In addition, the Germans have put into operation, so they claim, a new type of submarine which uses highly compressed oxygen with which to operate diesel engines even while running submerged. It is claimed that these new submarines have much greater speed and cruising range and, since they carry no electric batteries, a vastly larger torpedo capacity.

The British, recognizing the urgency of the problem, have appointed a special committee of high-ranking military and naval men to study the problem. It is a notable fact that in the waters around Great Britain, the anti-submarine campaign is under the direction of the air force, a tribute to the efficiency of the airplane in seeking out and destroying the undersea boats.

Are the American navy and the Maritime Commission doing everything that can reasonably be asked, to block the submarines? One hopes so; but we cannot forget that both these organizations have a disturbing past record in this connection. One year ago, German submarines were taking a terrible toll off the American coast, as they are now taking a similar toll in the eastern Atlantic and around Africa. At that time the navy was amazingly reluctant to build small escort vessels of the type experience has proved most effective. It built them, moreover, like a watch, with little recognition of the emergency and the need for haste. It insisted on using extremely scarce metals in places where they are not necessary. It is obvious, as the navy says, that the fighting equipment must be of the best and that gun crews must be highly trained, which takes time. It is also obvious that public pressure and only public pressure pushed the navy and the Maritime Commission out of their apathy a year ago.

Today, there are people who say that a similar campaign of public pressure is again necessary. They say that desk-bound admirals are not giving adequate consideration to speeding up the program, or to consideration of new devices. It is charged that the authorities are building too many destroyers and not enough corvettes, which can be turned out so much faster. We are told that our merchant ships are too big, of too deep draught, and too slow. Proposals have been made for much smaller ships, perhaps built of concrete, and possibly radio-controlled from one escort vessel, so as to curtail the loss of life in a sinking. Such vessels could be so shallow in draught that many torpedoes would go entirely under them. It is said further that the navy is not giving enough attention to the helicopter, the new-type airplane which can rise vertically from a ship's deck, return in the same way, and hover in the air over any given spot for a long period of time. A further criticism is that dirigibles, now being used in coastal work, have not been considered seriously enough for use out over the ocean.

The merits of these criticisms are technical questions, on which technicians should be heard (though many times in the past laymen have proved to be right, and technicians wrong, about startling innovations). We do know, however, that the past record of the authorities charged with this responsibility is not such as to inspire confidence that, left to their own devices, they will do as much as is necessary, and do it in time.

THE NEW REPUBLIC
A Journal of Opinion

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The Fight for Food

IN 1943, THE STRUGGLE for more food will be the most bitter and crucial of all struggles on the home front.

American farms lost two million workers to the armed forces and industry in 1942. They produced 11 percent more than in 1941. This year, with another million men leaving the land, the farmers are out to raise production by another four percent. It will mean long hours, back-breaking work. It will mean hardship for the United Nations, because it is not enough.

In 1942 American workers raised our war production by 350 percent. Now they must increase it by another 183 percent. To do this their food standards must be sustained. But how? In 1942 one farm in eight was working for the armed forces and for our allies; in 1943 it will be one farm in four. Together, lease-lend and the armed forces took 10 percent of our beef; 8 percent of our butter; 25 percent of our canned vegetables, in 1942. In 1943 they will take 20 percent of our butter, 20 percent of our beef, one-half of the canned vegetables that we produce.

If 1943 is as good a year as 1942 we may get by without lowering civilian standards. But 1942 was the best year for climate that our farmers can remember. With our present farm goals, and only a normal crop year ahead of us, we shall not have enough food. One of the three, civilians, the army or our allies, will take the loss.

The army and lease-lend must not take the loss. Soldiers must have more food in 1943, and food of the highest protective value. The needs of our allies must also be met. We are shipping food to Britain; but the British people are so close to the subsistence line that any reduction in our shipments would drastically affect their war production.

We are shipping food to North Africa, but not enough. North Africa usually exports barley and fats and oils. But the Vichy administration stripped it bare for the Nazis. Today Britain is shipping more food to North Africa than we are, but our combined supplies are low. We shall have to send workers instead of soldiers to General Eisenhower, unless he can recruit native laborers to build his docks, roads, airfields, barracks. Eisenhower today is finding it hard to recruit African workers because they can buy nothing with their wages.

We are shipping food to Russia—not enough. Russia has lost her greatest farming regions, the Ukraine and the Don basin. Millions of civilians are near starvation in Russia. The Russians are asking for food, not for them, but for the Red Army. It must be supplied.

If we meet these requirements from the production that we are preparing for now, our civilians, in 1943, will have 10 percent less meat and dairy products. They may have no more than half of the 1942 supply of canned vegetables on which city workers rely so heavily. We may even be short of potatoes. A dry year will carry our civilians almost down to British levels of nutrition.

But hold on. We have not begun to prepare for the greatest demand of all—the demand of 425,000,000 hungry Europeans. We are, presumably, going to invade Europe in 1943. Great parts of Europe today—Poland, Belgium, Greece, Italy—are starving, and through all of occupied Europe nutrition standards are below the minimum needed to maintain health. We have not been able to promise the peoples of Europe freedom if they will rise up against the fascists—but we have promised them food. On the basis of this promise we hope that they will overthrow the Nazis at the hour of invasion. We do not now possess the food to keep our promise.

Our stocks are low, and we are not increasing them. We are not even preparing to create reserves of fats and oils and dehydrated foods for Europe. Our present lease-lend program is $5,000,000 a day of food purchases; Europe alone, as we regain it, may need $10,000,000 to $15,000,000 worth of food a day if its nutrition standards are to be raised to minimum levels. We cannot begin to meet this program with our present production goals.

This means trouble. It means trouble for our allies, if, as has happened already, the outcry against shortages in America is inflamed until the lease-lend program is interrupted. It means trouble for America, and not just in an immediate sense. Already the farmers are talking among themselves. They know that the American people are bitter against them for the high cost of scarce foods. They know that they are working harder than ever before, and producing more than ever before. Where is it all going? If Russia and Britain weren't taking so much, we could eat well, couldn't we? Of course, say the appeasers, who are hard at work stirring up this idea. On this reaction against lease-lend, which they seek to exploit, Nye and Wheeler are hoping to recreate America First.

We are in this trouble because our farm production has not yet been put on a war basis. In 1942, industry undertook to increase its total output by 20 percent. Farmers were called upon to increase production by 9 percent. In 1943, industry is being asked to expand by 10 percent, the farmers by 6 percent. Industry certainly has had unused resources to call upon; the farmers have had an even greater proportion of resources that are still misused.

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The fact is that agriculture is a year behind industry in expansion and in conversion. Agriculture is today where industry was in December, 1941. To set beside the raw-material monopolists who refused to expand production, there are the organizations of the large farmers, who are insisting that expansion shall take place only on their terms and under their control. With the business men who wanted to produce, compare the men on the family-size farms who can raise our production goals. For the indecision and drift of the OPM under Knudsen, there are the drift and indecision of the Department of Agriculture under the domination of the AAA. For the young officials who forced the issue that led to the WPB, there are the militant officials within the Department. The resignation of two of these men, Herbert Parisius, Director of Food Production for the Department of Agriculture, and Don Montgomery, its Consumer Council, has brought the issue close to a decision.

This issue has been presented as a bureaucratic struggle. It is not. It is an issue of fundamental farm policy, an issue of whether the family-size farm is to be the basic unit in American agriculture or is to give way to the farm factory. On one side of this issue are the leaders of a liberal farm policy; on the other side are the majority of the land-grant colleges, the land banks, the AAA and the big four: the National Grange, the National Council of Farm Coöperatives, the National Coöperative Milk Producers' Federation and the American Farm Bureau Federation.

The roots of the farm policy which this second group represents lie in the last war. Agriculture, even more than industry, suffered from overexpansion in wartime, in relation to post-war markets. The post-war crash left farmers ruined, their minds set against war, dead set against overexpansion.

From the war also, the organizations of the big farmers grew. The necessity of increasing farm production led the government, in 1914, to establish the system of county agents to give the farmers the benefits of the research work of the land-grant colleges. The necessity of working with these county agents, and of struggling for two further reforms—a system of land banks and federal assistance for vocational training—made it necessary for farmers to organize. Business men who dominated the war effort through the State Defense Councils helped the farmers in order to increase sales of farm implements. In this situation the Farm Bureau Federation was born.

In the long period of adjustment in the twenties, the Farm Bureau Federation remained a mass organization. It lived off public funds in the land banks, the vocational-training system and the extension service, and it brought these public agencies under its control. The federation itself passed under the utterly reactionary leadership of the Illinois Agricultural Association. Under Earl Smith, a rich business man supplying farmers, the dues of the Illinois Agricultural Association were raised to $15, and membership was restricted to the wealthiest farmers.

When the Farm Bureau Federation failed to aid the farmers in the depression its membership fell from 1,000,000 to 146,000. In the North it was almost finished. In 1932, as a final gesture, Smith installed a Southerner, Ed O'Neal, as president of the Federation in the hope of keeping it a semi-official organization under the incoming New Deal.

Under the New Deal the one million large farm units which produce half our farm production were cared for through the AAA and the Farm Credit Administration. To staff the AAA, the Department of Agriculture was forced to rely on the Federation-dominated land-grant colleges. Even in the Washington offices of the AAA, loyalties were diffused and unclear. To establish its independence, Wallace placed administrative authority in the AAA under local farm committeemen. Yet the Farm Bureau Federation held its position of domination. It made the most of its chance to rebuild its membership on AAA payments. To regain its lost membership, it turned largely to the South, organizing the Southern planters. With AAA help it succeeded.

On the other side in this struggle there are a part of the three million family-size farms that are largely unrepresented; and 500,000 small farm units. These units were first organized under the Resettlement Administration. Today they are represented by the Farmers' Union and the Farm Security Administration.

In contrast to the AAA, the FSA is a centralized service of 15,000 full-time officials. These experts analyze the soil of the FSA farms and advise on crops. They supervise methods of production, and extend credit to small farmers for the purchase of fertilizer, of livestock, of equipment and farm buildings. They watch the health of the farm families and, within the means of FSA, provide health services. The great strength of the FSA is in the South. There, its workers have given equal treatment to Negroes; they have raised standards and reduced the dependence of the small farmers upon merchants and planters. They have subdivided large units and, through supervision and cheap credit, have made small units pay. The Farmers' Union, which has grown from the FSA program, has challenged the domination of the Federation. So the FSA is hated by the great Southern wing of the American Farm Bureau Federation.

Today the issue between these two groups has become an issue of all-out farm mobilization.

The Farm Security Administration has always favored increased farm production. It had a vested interest in greater production, because, for the poorly run farms which it reorganizes, greater production is the best means of repaying FSA loans. The FSA has

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increased production not through the indirect method of raising prices, but through direct intervention to improve and extend the farm plant and to improve production techniques.

In contrast, the AAA leaders have been trained in seven years of restricting production. They have been defeatist from the start. They fear overexpansion; they hope for a short war. Behind them, some Farm Bureau Federation leaders have also resisted expansion. Under the influence of the Federation, quota restrictions were held on corn acreage until this January. Wheat is an even worse example of their policy. One of the greatest savings in food output may come if wheat is substituted for corn as feed for hogs. By the full use of the Plains states, wheat output can be raised by 50 percent. Yet under such leaders as Earl Smith, who fear that corn will suffer if wheat is established as a feed for hogs, farmers who increase their wheat acreage are still subject to heavy penalties. In the summer of 1942, the wheat referendum held by the Department of Agriculture fixed the present wheat quota below 1941 levels.

The greatest bottleneck in raising farm production is manpower. The solution of the AAA, which is not equipped for manpower mobilization, is to pay the farmers a price high enough to get the labor they need. In contrast, the FSA went after unused resources of farm labor. It found that 75,000 farm families, in thirty-five Kentucky counties, produced in 1939 a total of only $61 worth of farm products for the market. It organized a camp for these families to save the beet-sugar crop in Michigan. In the cotton states, FSA officials found that 2,000,000 men on short-staple cotton worked only 175 days a year. It prepared a program fully to mobilize these men.

A second bottleneck is credit. The Farm Credit Administration has not been equipped to advance needed credit on the terms on which it can be accepted. The FSA has done this.

A third bottleneck is machinery. The AAA has spent its time demanding greater production of farm machinery; the FSA has advanced programs for sharing the machinery that we possess.

The Farm Bureau Federation and AAA way to increase production is by higher prices. As a method it has been proved to be ineffective. The benefits of price increases go mainly to the large farmers. Yet the large farms, already operating at full capacity, cannot greatly increase production. The increase must come from the family-size farms.

The experience of 1942 proves this. In 1942 total milk production increased 3 percent; the production of FSA borrowers increased 29 percent. The total production of beef increased 3 percent, the production of FSA borrowers rose by 45 percent. In eggs the increases were 15 and 38 percent, in chickens 9 and 44 percent; in sugar beets 16 and 34 percent. The FSA program was applied to only 8 percent of all farm units. Yet this 8 percent of small farmers provided more than 54 percent of the increase in milk products, 32 percent of the increased production of eggs, 19 percent of the increase in chickens; 33 percent of the increased production of beans.

We must revise our farm goals, and greatly increase our farm production. We can do it only through FSA methods. Yet today it is the AAA and Farm Bureau Federation which are growing in strength. Today the FSA is about to be destroyed.

When the duplication of authority in farm production became intolerable, the President, on December 5, appointed Claude Wickard as Food Director. Under Wickard the Department of Agriculture was reorganized into three sections—research, production and distribution. Production was given to Parisius with a directive to unify his administration on a state and county level. Parisius understood that the unified structure had to be based on full-time production directors rather than on farm committeemen. He prepared a program for increasing farm production through the direct techniques of the FSA. This was too much for the Farm Bureau. Under pressure, Wickard named AAA men to key positions in the Food Production Administration. In protest Parisius resigned.

Today the Food Production Administration is in the hands of the AAA. In Congress, a rebellion against the FSA, led by Republicans and farm-bloc members, has been organized by the Farm Bureau Federation. A similar rebellion was organized last year and the FSA survived it only by fighting with such determination that the administration was forced to defend it. This year the Farm Bureau has laid its lines more carefully. For months its leaders in the South have been stirring up a lynching spirit against the FSA; declaring that it is out to give equality to the Negroes, and that it will nationalize the land and bring about communism. Support for the FSA has been weakened. In the Department of Agriculture Wickard, Sam Bledsoe and others have made it clear that when the Department's appropriations come up before Congress they will not fight for the FSA.

The Farmers' Union and the FSA will fight for a militant farm program, but with what weapons? Of their supporters, only a third have paid their poll taxes; none can raise slush funds to match those of the big four. The city congressmen, our representatives, can win this struggle. They must be aroused. The United Nations need more food. We can produce it. Britain, without an able-bodied laborer left on her farms, has raised her food output by one-half since the war began. With real farm leadership we can do the same. Within two months this round will be won or lost. This is where we should pitch in.

Washington MICHAEL STRAIGHT

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As Goes Missouri?

IN A REPORT on the recent Republican knife-whetting in St. Louis, printed in The New Republic of December 21, this correspondent called particular attention to an impending special congressional election in the Sixth Missouri District as the first recheck in the country on the widespread Republican gains of November 3. He now reports the results with the conviction that they are so important that everyone who cares about the political future of the United States should have the opportunity to study them in detail.

The Republicans have not only won the eleven-county district again. They have swept it by so large a majority this time that the increase, if extended on a national basis, would place the Republicans in full command of the House of Representatives, with a more than generous advantage, and give them several additional seats in the Senate.

Here are the facts:

On November 3, Republican Philip A. Bennett defeated Democrat Sam Wear by a margin of 7,789 in a total vote of 85,681. Bennett, the incumbent, was serving out his first term in a district which had been Democratic from the start of the New Deal until 1940. His record on administration foreign-policy measures was such as to gain him a place in a preëlection book entitled "The Illustrious Dunderheads." That record proved no handicap at the polls, for Bennett carried eight of the eleven counties.

The reëlected Representative died a month later in Washington and Missouri's Governor, Forrest C. Donnell, called a special election for January 12, certain time requirements with respect to nominations needing to be fulfilled under the law. The Democrats promptly renominated Wear, since he is a highly regarded lawyer of Springfield, the district's largest city. To oppose him, the Republicans chose the late incumbent's twenty-eight-year-old son and secretary, Marion F. Bennett, also a Springfield lawyer.

Young Bennett's nomination gave the Democrats the chance to oppose him on his age. They made the most of it. They placed advertisements in the newspapers reading: "Old men for counsel; young men for wars." "Do you want Bennett in Congress at $10,000 a year," they asked the voters, "or in the army at $50 a month?" At the same time the Democrats were careful to point to the fact that Wear is the father of two boys in the armed forces, whereas Bennett is married but has no children. What they did not know when they launched this kind of appeal was that the young Republican had volunteered last summer only to be rejected for physical reasons. Using a letter from the military authorities, he effectively turned the Democrats' argument against them.

The campaign, though short, was as intensive as gasoline rationing and other war conditions would permit. The nominees themselves bore the brunt of the contest, though the Republicans brought in Gov. Harold E. Stassen of Minnesota and Rep. Dewey Short. The Democrats privately acknowledged the handwriting on the wall and imported no speakers aside from Missouri's Sen. Harry S. Truman. But they did not in any sense give up the fight. The Sunday before the election newspaper analysts predicted a majority of about 3,500 for the youthful Republican in a total vote not to exceed 35,000.

This was a repetition of the mistake of last fall when the political experts greatly underestimated the Republican strength. For the voters came out 54,319 strong and gave 62 percent of their ballots to the twenty-eight-year-old. The totals were Bennett 34,145 and Wear 20,174—a Republican majority of 13,971. That is not all. This time the Republicans won not eight counties but eleven out of eleven!

Here is something to give every friend of the administration in Washington gravest concern. Only those who are either innocent or blind will fail to see its basic significance. The Sixth Missouri District is a cross section of America. Its largest cities, Springfield, Sedalia and Warrenburg, are typical of communities from Maine to California. Its economic life is representative —railroad shops, mills, small factories, agricultural markets, farms and Ozark fruit country. To realize how far the reaction has gone it is necessary to know that the region's Representative in Congress for the first eight years of the New Deal was none other than the president of the Missouri State Federation of Labor, Reuben T. Wood.

This election is significant as providing an answer for those who said that the November 3 results would have been materially different had the African campaign been opened a week or so earlier and had food and manpower administrators been chosen earlier.

Most important of all, from now on it will be impossible for administration leaders to dismiss the November overturn as an accident. An accumulation of diverse factors accounted for a total Republican vote for House candidates larger than that of the Democrats, but it was no accident. As The St. Louis Post-Dispatch said the day after this recent reaffirmation:

> If the Roosevelt administration has any regard for its political future, it will read the returns of this double check in the Middle West, study them carefully and act accordingly. One of the things it will quit doing is playing politics as usual. It will make no more Boss Flynn appointments.

St. Louis IRVING DILLIARD

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Trouble Among Japanese Americans[1]

TROUBLE has been experienced in the past few weeks in a number of the Japanese Relocation Centers. The disturbances at Poston, Arizona, and Manzanar, California, were sufficiently serious to get into the papers; and there have been others which indicate pretty clearly that something is the matter.

I had been at Poston until a short time before the disturbance and I am afraid I must report that the newspaper interpretation of it—that the rioters were merely pro-Axis elements—was oversimplified. Pro-Japanese sentiment, and a plain hoodlum element in the center, played a part in the trouble. But the situation of which the troublemakers took advantage was produced by other causes, chiefly two: the great sense of frustration which all members of the camps feel and the great cleavage between the first and second generation which has made the American-born, who coöperate with the authorities, the subject of attack. "As you have not been treated as Americans, your coöperation must be opportunism," is the charge. In the case of the trouble at the Jerome center in Arkansas, where threats of violence and reluctance to participate in communal work have been reported, the factor of contact with the native attitudes toward the Negro is also involved.

It must be remembered that these 110,000 people are in the camps presumably only because they were unable to find places to go, voluntarily, before the mass-evacuation order was issued. They should not be confused with the 1,974 suspected enemy aliens in internment camps. There are ten relocation areas, managed by the civilian War Relocation Authority, in undeveloped regions of Arizona, California, Utah, Wyoming, Colorado and Arkansas. Evacués live in barracks, often overcrowded, with communal services as in the army. The extreme boundaries are guarded by the military.

If coöperation with the authorities has unfortunately become a hazard, it has been made so in part by the decision of the WRA limiting participation in government to the American-born. Only they may belong to the community councils which have been set up in the camps as a measure of democracy. While two-thirds of the population are citizens, less than half of them are of adult age, and it is this inexperienced group that has had to bear the burden of the responsibility. Their parents are for the most part old: their average age is fifty-six. They have helped build America and have sacrificed their lives so that their children might enjoy the fruits of American citizenship. Evacuation has meant for them a bitter realization of failure. The small concessions made in camp to the citizenship of their children seem to them unrealistic and unrepresentative.

The riots, though deplorable, were in a sense helpful, since they attracted attention to problems which can only be solved with the help of public opinion. The solution decided on by the WRA is to remove as many as possible of the loyal evacués for work in communities outside the military areas. They see that resettlement and assimilation must be pushed forward now, while the shortage of labor throughout the country makes it economically easier. So far about a thousand have obtained their release, three hundred of them in colleges and universities. The FBI has agreed to certify for exit, in advance, individuals who are looking for jobs, which should speed up the process somewhat.

To date there is no provision for redistribution of the evacués from the centers except as individuals. Placement of them, sight-unseen and with general suspicion rampant, is difficult enough, but added to this is the reluctance on the part of the Japanese to go out alone into a part of the country they have never seen, where they fear discrimination, and where they will be cut off from the social contacts upon which they depend. This is especially true of the parents, whose individual adjustment to a strange community would be extremely difficult. As they constitute the skilled farmers who formerly grew an annual crop worth more than $100,000,000 in California, group resettlement of them, limited perhaps to twenty-five families each, would not only facilitate their exit but return them to a productivity which is badly needed. To a planned program for selected areas they could bring their own resources on a coöperative basis.

Group relocation, of course, need not and should not be limited to racial groups. The American-born, at least, should be available as part of the War Manpower Pool, for placement in small groups in factories. Their association with the larger American group should result in their speedy assimilation.

It is also hoped that the army will resume selective service of Americans of Japanese origin. There were nearly five thousand in the services when further enlistments were halted, shortly before the evacuation, and calls for volunteers who can read and write Japanese have recently been issued. A renewed opportunity for joining the United States armed forces would have a deeply beneficial psychological effect.

Perhaps 30,000 of the 110,000 now in the relocation centers can be resettled and, given public support for

[1] Isamu Noguchi, the writer of this article, is a well known American sculptor. His father is the Japanese poet, Yone Noguchi, his mother, an American. He has recently returned from the relocation center of Poston, Arizona, to which he went voluntarily last April; his object in going was to help relocation by contributing his services as an artist in developing the areas. Evacués may now leave the camps to take private employment anywhere in the area between the Alleghenies and the Rocky Mountains. The changed policy of discouraging any activity that might give the Japanese an incentive to stay in the camps has forced his return to New York.—THE EDITORS

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the effort, will be. Of the remaining 80,000, a certain number of hoodlums and "pro-Axis" people, plus perhaps those who have signed up for repatriation to Japan, should be moved to a separate camp, as has been suggested. All the others, except as they may be relocated in groups, are going to stay in the relocation centers a long time.

Will there be a real attempt to make these areas self-supporting before the people in them become too demoralized? It would be tragic—and very expensive as well—if they came to be simply stagnant reservations for the old, the misfit and the very young. Here again there seems to be a possibility for small-group tenancies, whereby at least a few of the relocation areas may be developed by the evacués themselves, with their own capital, tools and manual skill.

Finally, I hope that the WRA will attempt to deal with these people as a whole, in problems of self-government, rather than dealing merely with the second-generation group. As individuals leave to take work outside, the age divisions among those left will become even more unbalanced. The stabilizing influence of the parents will be still more needed in the government of the centers. It is estimated that about 50 percent of the non-citizens are now at least passively loyal to America. I think that this proportion could be increased and I think this effort, too, is worth making, if only for their influence on the children. Steps along this road would be opening the Community Councils to the parents, establishing an Inter-Center Relocation Council and putting into effect an adult-education program, with a newspaper or bulletin printed in Japanese and English. Through it the evacués themselves could assist in the problem of relocation.

Poston has finally received a priority rating for the purchase of materials for school buildings to be constructed by the evacués. Surely it is understandable that the degree of coöperation for community projects that can be obtained in any of the centers depends upon the degree to which the people feel that they are being occupied in work that will lead to a self-respecting future for them. The solution of the problem is, in short, to return the evacués to their normal civilian status both by getting them out of the centers and by making the centers themselves as much like other places in America as possible.

ISAMU NOGUCHI

De Gaulle

THE MOVEMENT ASSOCIATED with the name of Gen. Charles de Gaulle began as a radio appeal. In the last desperate week of French organized resistance, when the new Pétain government was preparing to surrender, General de Gaulle, speaking from London where he had gone on an official mission, attacked the policy of surrender because it was a policy of despair. His argument was simple, only in the most fundamental sense political. The war was not over and was not lost. And the policy which was soon so appropriately associated with the name of Vichy was based on two propositions: that the war was over bar a little unimportant English shouting, and that it was lost. Nothing remained to do but to make the best and quickest peace possible—no matter how harsh the German terms, they were better than a continuation of a futile massacre in France, than the pointless extension of the war to the Empire, especially to North Africa, the only part of the Empire which has really close ties with the metropolis.

At the moment that de Gaulle spoke, all that could be done was to deny these assertions. Somebody had to do it and there was no one else available. All attempts to renew the war in Morocco, or Algiers, all attempts to find a spokesman for France failed. There was only de Gaulle. And he had two claims to speak. He, more than any other French professional soldier had been free from the Maginot-line complex and the Maginot-line mentality. He had, too, been one of the few French generals who had added to their reputation in the brief campaign of 1940. But, it must be admitted, few in France knew this about him; not many knew anything about him, even his name. He was a rising soldier, an interesting man, known outside professional military circles as the military brain trust of Paul Reynaud and that was all.[1]

To expect miracles from a practically unknown soldier appealing against the professional opinion of Pétain and Weygand to a nation overwhelmed by unprecedented and unexpected disasters was a folly—if it was committed. But I am not at all sure that it was committed. What was expected (wrongly as it turned out) was a violent political and military reaction against the policy announced by Pétain in his disastrous broadcast. No "honorable peace between soldiers" was possible. Resistance was possible and it was hoped that this truth would be appreciated by "*les grands chefs.*" They, as is their wont, did nothing, said nothing, accepted the fact of military defeat as final. Putting one's trust in senior officers is a perennial civilian illusion. That trust was put, in vain, in June, 1940.

It is not necessarily to the discredit of the senior officer that he despairs rather easily. For one thing if

[1] If I may be permitted a personal note; I was first conscious of de Gaulle's name when he entered the Reynaud administration as a junior minister. Yet, when clearing out books I had accumulated for a book on modern France, I found that I had owned, read and annotated "La France et Son Armee." I had quite forgotten the author's name—and even the fact that this book was dedicated to Pétain.

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he despairs, he can always claim to be right; for if he despairs he loses the battle. Then, as a professional, he sees the weight of forces on each side; he can compute in military arithmetic better than civilians can —and as long as that is the only computation that counts, he is right. So Ludendorff was the first German to despair in 1918; Pétain the first Frenchman in 1940 (though in the Marshal's case despair was as much a personal habit of mind as a professional attitude; he despaired on the eve of victory in 1918 as he did on the eve of defeat in 1940).[1] There was nothing surprising in the refusal of the senior generals in Syria or Morocco to follow a lead given by a junior general who, in addition to committing the crime of speaking before he was asked, had been reasonably pessimistic in March, 1940, when the Maginot illusions were all the rage and so was inoculated against the despair that overcame men who had put their faith in any irrelevant system of war. To be told what to do by a junior was bad enough; to be told what to do by a junior who had been right was even worse.

Whatever the reasons, with one or two exceptions, no French higher officer in a position of independent command resisted the policy of surrender. The exceptions are worth noting. For one of them, General Catroux, was free from the criticisms brought against de Gaulle. He was not a junior "two star" general, but a "five star" general (a *général d'armée*, the rank just below marshal). And he was not a newcomer to statecraft, a mere undersecretary. He was the Governor-General of Indo-China, the richest French colony, the colony furthest from German power. Yet Catroux, one of the best known French generals, was not able to bring over his own colony or to shake the trust of the colonial officers and officials in the Marshal's policy. Legentilhomme, Governor of Jibuti, equally failed. And Jibuti remained loyal to Vichy, although following on the British victories of the winter of 1940-41, it was entirely surrounded by British territory, cut off from France and from all other French colonies and, one may assume, particularly animated by anti-Axis feelings, since Jibuti was the most obvious and certain Italian gain from an Axis victory. Not only was Jibuti held for Vichy for two and a half years (despite numerous desertions of individuals and small groups), but even after the invasion of North Africa and the *volte-face* of Darlan, it held out, and when it finally gave in, its officers and men rallied to de Gaulle, not to Darlan or Giraud. Once they took the decisive step, they took the rest. *"Ce n'est que le premier pas qui coute."* And the first step of revolt against the Marshal was a revolutionary step that involved others.

This was probably not realized by anybody in the early days of the de Gaulle movement. Up to the catastrophe of Dakar (where, as in North Africa in November, 1942, overoptimistic estimates had been made of the readiness of the local authorities to see reason) the calculation may have been that once it was obvious that England was not making peace, a sense of national honor and national interest would lead to a series of local rejections of the armistice, that the French Empire would reënter the war which the event showed it need not have quitted.

The calculation did not fail entirely. Very important territories did not join de Gaulle, territories important for their resources or for their strategic position or both. French Equatorial Africa (so important as an air route as well as for its economic resources) was won over by an able Negro governor, M. Felix Eboué, though some fighting was needed before it was made available to the anti-Axis war effort. The very rich and very important island of New Caledonia rallied to the cause locally represented by Australia, despite the temptation to follow the example of Admiral Decoux in Indo-China or Admiral Robert in the West Indies. In the first case, New Caledonia was saved from being another back-door to Japanese aggression; in the second, it was saved from being a Capua where officers and men like Candide can cultivate their gardens in an atmosphere of *dolce far niente* that recalls the pleasant isle of Aves more than a territory of a nation, occupied, robbed, humiliated. The State Department may regret that it was not given a chance to make a deal that neutralized Libreville and New Caledonia, that took as many French assets out of the war as possible. But the Navy Department which, thanks to the de Gaulle movement, has these bases and, in addition, Tahiti and the Marquesas, probably thinks differently. Nevertheless, the policy of bringing all the French Empire (and the French fleet) back into the war by means of patriotic appeals, even brilliant patriotic appeals, failed. General de Gaulle is almost as much a radio wizard as the President of the United States, but there are many things that cannot be done by a radio talk. One of them, it proved, was to shake the authority of the government of Vichy, even in vast, remote islands like Madagascar, controlled by the British navy, immune to German threats and, as was believed before Pearl Harbor and Singapore, to Japanese threats.

The reasons for this failure deserve some examination. One is of temporary importance for the present and future policy of the United Nations. Because we talk of the British, French and Dutch Empires we confuse very different kinds of policies. The British and Dutch Empires, though in differing degrees, have independent and semi-autonomous governments and a tradition of independent action which is totally lacking in the French Empire. This is not necessarily a discredit to the French Empire. That as an imperial power they have got something is shown by the astonishing fact that, at the lowest and most disastrous point in French history, French authority has not been challenged from

[1] The soldier is not always wrong in refusing to follow civilian heroic—and foolish—policies. The classic case of Lee v. Jefferson Davis is admirably put by Charles Francis Adams II in "Lee at Appomattox." We can hardly doubt that Lee was right in 1865.

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within by tens of millions of subject peoples. But this power of command is exercised by a small group of officials, themselves trained in absolute and blind obedience to the constituted authority, whatever it is.[1]

That so many men trained in this tradition rallied to de Gaulle is a ground of wonder, not that the whole Empire did not do what it had never done, resist the latest decision of the political authority in France. And even if the title of that political authority was doubtful, if it had come into existence through a military defeat and an illegal delegation of power, that was one of the ways by which legitimate governments had been established in France since 1789. The Government of National Defeat of 1940 came into existence more legally than the Government of National Defense in 1870. Both were provisional, both were irregular, but in France it is "only the temporary that lasts." But there is another aspect of the French Empire that is of greater and more permanent importance. The French colonial empire had its acute problems as all empires have and it had its acute political problems as all empires deserve to have. They were not less political for being disguised as economic. The French Empire for reasons that on the whole are to the credit of France had less mere political trouble than the British Empire had, but it had its basic troubles all the same. Was the Empire to be exploited by the methods and in the interests of high capitalism? It was an acute question in Indo-China (with the rubber companies); in tropical Africa (with the aftermath of the great concessions); in North Africa (with the question of land tenure, of the role of the landless Arab laborer). In North Africa (and in Indo-China) there was also a straight nationalist movement, a movement for independence in Indo-China, a movement for equality in North Africa. And all these questions were urgent; all could be settled one way or the other. The armistice gave a chance for settling them one way. For, naturally enough, French egalitarian principles were less active in the Empire than in France. Rigid democratic principles ruin empires. Moreover, the conservative elements in French society, more or less excluded from politics and not sure of their prospects in the internal administration, crowded into the colonies, both as officials and as settlers, that is, as planters. When the disaster came, the first reaction of many of these officials and settlers was to resist, and if the legal government had gone to North Africa, they would have obeyed and fought, but the Laval-Pétain palace revolution deprived them of the temptation to enter in the dangerous path of fighting a war of liberation from an imperial base, dangerous not as much for the mother country as for their ideas of the present and future of the imperial base.[1]

While the attempt to provoke or encourage a revolt in the Empire (by which the white officials and officers were meant) was failing, the de Gaulle movement acquired, not suddenly, not unexpectedly, but, in the time and circumstances, rather quickly, a function as a focus of resistance in France. The original thesis of the movement was that the Empire plus Britain would liberate France. But the logic of events was too much for the plan. The Empire did not move and Britain, from being only less unpopular than Germany (and not always or in all places even that), became not loved but respected with a new respect, admired with a new admiration. From being a handicap, the British affiliations of the de Gaulle movement became an asset. That the movement had to start from London was a handicap. But it reflected an unwelcome truth. Too seldom have we the place and the men and the situation all together. There was in the summer of 1940 only one place for a fighting movement preaching armed resistance to Hitler. It could not be located in Moscow. It could not be located in Washington. For Moscow was wrapped in a silence on the issues, the importance, the future of the war that the local Communist commentaries made even more baffling, and in Washington there was not only neutrality but a presidential election to allow for. It was impossible to run a movement insisting on the duty and profit of fighting Hitler from a country committed to all means of stopping Hitler—except fighting him. The gamut was run in Vichy from all aid to Britain short of renewing the war to all aid to Hitler short of entering the war again on the other side. (There were great differences between the attitude of any important section of American opinion and either pole of Vichy opinion, but you cannot run revolutionary movements on shades of differences.)

When the de Gaulle movement started there was only one place it could start and that was London, because there was only one possible base for an organiza-

[1] A French naval officer, a friend of mine, who had his destroyer sunk under him at Dunkirk and who joined de Gaulle, leaving a wife and three children in Brest under RAF bombs and German rule, asserted again and again at this time. "You are confusing the British Empire and the French Empire. These people will obey any orders that come from Paris or the successor of Paris." Another friend, a deputy who joined de Gaulle, told me of the sensation he caused when before the war he visited Dakar as a private individual, refused official hospitality or guidance and asserted truthfully and incredibly that he simply wanted to see what Dakar was like.

[1] I think that I have read every "inside" story on the fall of France, even the few written by Frenchmen. I am not convinced that there was, except in narrow circles, a premeditated treason or a spontaneous welcome for German victory. Had Vichy not had other supporters than the hacks of Brinon and Abetz, the pathological anti-Semites and Anglophobes, it would not have been so formidable. I take The Chicago Tribune more seriously than I take William Griffin of New York or even Father Coughlin. And I don't believe that Col. Robert R. McCormick doesn't want to win the war, or would not even welcome a brilliant American victory won under Mr. Roosevelt. So I don't believe in a fascist or cagoulard conspiracy turning over the Empire to Vichy. I do believe that there were—and are—elements in France and the Empire who argued that since there was defeat and disaster, what little good was possible ought to be extracted from them. It was not a case of "better Hitler than Blum," but "since we have to have Hitler, it would be a minor gain to smash any chance of a new *front populaire*." As far as France is concerned, this view is based on fairly wide knowledge. As far as North Africa is concerned, it is based on a three weeks' visit in 1939, a visit hardly long enough to justify even an English visitor in writing a book on the United States.

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tion that proposed to *fight* Hitler, not to vote against him, not to write manifestoes against him, but to fight him. If de Gaulle had been Colonel McCormick and had wanted to fight Hitler he would have needed to move his headquarters from Chicago, even if all his views on the English remained unchanged. Yet, having an English headquarters was a regrettable necessity. Relationships between allies are always difficult; the relationships between allies whose joint campaign has failed are even more difficult than ordinary inter-allied relationships; relationships between allies who then begin fighting each other (as the English and French did at Oran) are worst of all. The de Gaulle movement had to start from London and yet there was hardly a worse place to start from.

What saved the situation was the defeat of the German aerial invasion of Britain (which showed that a German victory was not inevitable) and the German raids on London, Coventry, etc., which showed that the British people were ready to stand the shock of German power, not merely to fight to the last Frenchman. The moral value of this fact in the winter when lots of Englishmen (and women and children) were being killed deliberately by the German air force and only a handful of Frenchmen (and women and children) accidentally by the RAF was very great. The propaganda appeals from London had a weight that they otherwise could not have had. They may not have kept it, but they had it at the critical moment. And the moment was very critical. For it was the moment when the French people, the man in the street in the occupied zone, were beginning to realize that there was no easy way out of the war. On June 25, 1940, Pétain had said on the air, "I hate the lies that have done you so much harm." By the end of the year in Paris and Rennes and Lille, the Pétain policy was simply a new lie (possibly innocent) which had done as much harm as any previous one. And men began to listen to the radio, "*Içi Londres,*" and to identify resistance with the practically unknown general who, from the very beginning, had pointed out the inconvenient truth about the honorable peace between soldiers promised by Pétain.

But more than that had happened. The revolutionary character of the situation had become obvious. It was unfortunate but not fatal that the Communist line was still "a plague on both your houses," still a refusal to see any important difference between present German and potential British imperialism. For the French workers had a real revolutionary situation before them which no slogans could conceal. They had the mere *status quo* of 1939 minus political liberty, national dignity and material well being which was all that Vichy had to offer—and they had resistance which was bound to be more than mere patriotic resentment. If the French government had gone into exile, if the classes in France which had made a profession of patriotism had lived up to their creed, patriotism might have been enough. (It has been enough, however the fact may distress liberals, in most European countries.) But in France there was a confusion that forced Frenchmen back to first principles. It forced and—right down to January, 1943—continued to force Frenchmen of all classes, including men who held high office under Vichy and knew as much of its innermost secrets as if they had been Ernest Lindley or even George Sokolsky, to join de Gaulle openly or to work for him secretly. But above all, it forced the French workers and *petits bourgeois* back to their old principles and old passions. For the upper classes, in many individual cases in complete innocence and helplessness, were forced to become partners in German exploitation. I could name men of the highest character and competence who have been forced to collaborate in circumstances which do not allow me the right to judge them.

But the French people, humiliated, starved, butchered, will not forgive. There were many Tories of high character who had to go into exile in 1783, leaving their lands to Cabots and Lowells who were luckier, not better or braver. With the French Tories are mingled profiteers, mere grafters, mere success-worshipers, all marked as men who could get along with the Germans. It was a European statesman who knows Europe as well as most State Department officials, and America better than many, who said to me that the great division today in France was between those who could survive on the official rations and those who could eat well on the black market. And the second class consists of the rich and the friends of the Germans. From this point of view, the higher Vichy officials, even if they do not take advantage of their privileges, are privileged in the public eye. Without any planning, the de Gaulle movement became the chief, not the only but the chief, symbol of the underprivileged, the people of France, the people Admiral Leahy and Robert Murphy did not meet. It may not have deserved to be the chief symbol; it is not and never has been the only symbol. Its role was threatened when Hitler invaded Russia. With all European peoples (including the English) the Russian resistance has been the great, heroic theme of this war. But the effect in France was to help the resistance movement, that is, to help de Gaulle. The Germans aided by shooting people indiscriminately as Communists or de Gaullists. Often their victims were neither. But the identification stuck. The Russians were the people who knew the answers concealed from Gamelin, Weygand and Pétain. The de Gaullists were the people who had never spoken well of the Germans, unlike MM. Pétain, Darlan and Laval.

I repeat, the identification may have been unjust, but it was made; in France and all over Europe. It was made by Radio Paris, by Radio Vichy, by Radio Maroc. The main organizations of popular resistance in France faced this fact; willingly or unwillingly, I know not. But they made their terms with what was then called

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La France Libre and is now called *La France Combattante*, with the National Committee which sits in London. There was a corresponding evolution in London. Whether de Gaulle was originally a reactionary, again I cannot say. But the failure of the mere counter-pronunciamento forced the movement into really revolutionary channels. The docility of French soldiers and officials forced a reconsideration of the French social structure. The most unpopular class in France (as everywhere in Europe) was the conservative social class, "*les riches*," "*les gens bien*" whether they were bankers or soldiers. This class had, it appeared, no thought for the old unconditional patriotism when following out the old patriotic, no-surrender policy threatened its privileged position. Jacobinism, that is, revolutionary patriotism, was forced on the de Gaullist movement, especially after the beginning of the Russian war. (It is purely a guess on my part, but I am inclined to think that de Gaulle has been personally influenced by his admiration for the Red Army, so much more like the army of his dreams than the French army of 1940 which was created and commanded by the military chiefs that French society produced.) Internal resistance to the Germans, not diplomatic maneuvers or administrative evasions at Vichy or Wiesbaden, but the reaction of the French people in the occupied zone and even in the unoccupied zone became identified with de Gaullism where it was not identified with Communism—and where the two were not confused in the minds of the Germans, the men of Vichy and the people of France. It is a thought that occasionally gives me some *Schadenfreude*, that it was the very French higher bourgeoisie who failed in courage in 1940 who have made it certain that while the old order may be restored, with minor modifications, in some other countries, it cannot be restored in France. *Noblesse oblige*, as they said before 1789—and when it was discovered that the only obligations accepted by the nobility of France were privileges, the day of the Fourth of August was inevitable.

American policy, as far as it can be judged from the outside, is backing the old privileged orders in France against (among other forces) a movement that at any rate is now trying desperately to fight the tides. It is late in the French day to ignore all that has happened since William C. Bullitt left Paris. It is quite true that the State Department has sources of information that we private citizens, American or British, do not have. But the assumption or assertion that in all this question, the State Department and the State Department alone has been cooking with gas, will provoke some ribald souls to a Bronx cheer and more refined persons like myself to polite doubt. I do not assert and do not believe that the French National Committee is representative of all that counts now or will count in the future in France. But it does represent some things that are important. It represents, first of all, the refusal to admit the thesis that France should or could make peace, even temporary peace, with Hitlerism. (That has involved strained silence, at best, in face of the massacres in Lidice, in Warsaw, in Nantes. What hands Pétain and Darlan and others have shaken in the last two years!) It represents the principle that a France which withdrew from the conflict, even to return when the tide appeared to be turning, was a France that could be politically but not spiritually restored. The tricolor has been flying in the fleets and armies opposed to Hitler since September, 1939, to this day. That was the doing of the de Gaullist movement.

And, perhaps unwillingly, perhaps unconsciously, the movement has been forced to become political, to admit that this war is about other things than the territorial security of France and the Empire. It is not the only organized force that has claims on the future of a France freed from Hitlerism by the United Nations. It may not be the most important claimant. But it is among the runners in that race. The "good, the wise and the rich," to quote the old Federalist classification, are not. As the war has moved to its crisis, as the issues have been sharply drawn, I have been more and more impressed by a favorite text of mine from Burke. Burke was, as we all know, the apostle of the counter-revolution. Yet at the end of his life he felt the force of the movement of history. "If a great change is to be made in human affairs, the minds of men will be fitted to it; the general opinions and feelings will draw that way. Every fear, every hope will forward it."

Basically, it is because the French National Committee is not fighting against this great movement of history that it is important. Because its history has been checkered, its early hopes deceived, its character made for it by events, it has its present symbolic importance in France, in the other occupied countries and in England. It is not by its very nature condemned to futility, although of course it is not guaranteed even temporary victory or power in a liberated France. In this gray and grim world, it is something not to be predestined to defeat, as any policy based merely on the support, in France or the Empire, of the French higher officials, *les gens nantis* as Vandal called the political profiteers of the Directory, is certain to be. Of course, the profiteers of 1799 did turn the Revolution to their profit. But the Revolution had happened. Brumaire could not have been worked in 1793. And they had a chief with Arcola behind him and Austerlitz before him. He also had Waterloo before him. If the State Department has a Bonaparte up its sleeve, it should produce him. Even so, the distance between Austerlitz and Waterloo will be a lot shorter than ten years, if he or any other general or diplomat or even banker gets in the way of the great movement of the peoples of which the President of the United States has hitherto been so brilliant, so successful and so trusted a leader.

London D. W. BROGAN

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Washington Notes

Roosevelt at Sixty-one

IT MIGHT BE A GOOD IDEA for people who don't dance to celebrate Franklin D. Roosevelt's sixty-first birthday to ask themselves what might have happened in the United States and the world these last ten years without him. What if that assassin had hit Roosevelt instead of Tony Cermak? What if Jack Garner had become President? What if an enemy of organized labor had been sitting in the White House at the time of the sit-down strikes and troops had been sent into those plants shooting? What if timidity in Washington had depended on the natural operations of the business cycle to turn depression into prosperity? What if Britain had been left to fight it out alone with the Nazis? What if we had gone on supplying the Japanese with war materials?

History may be the product of its own logic. Roosevelt may have been pushed around by irresistible historic forces long gathering. But he has harnessed some of those forces and deflected others. He has left his mark on this decade. It is possible to argue either that the world would have been better off or worse off without that mark. It is impossible to argue that it wouldn't have been different. But this decade was prelude and the story remains to be written.

Roosevelt, at sixty-one, is admirably equipped to help write it. He is physically strong, mentally alert, resilient and thoroughly trained in the art of statecraft. There is no people in the world, including the German people, that lacks reason to be a little more hopeful of the future because Franklin D. Roosevelt is President of the United States. Looking back over his administration, one may point the finger at many failures, one may deplore many of the current trends for which the White House is responsible, but one cannot say with conviction: "Someone else could do this better." For Roosevelt's objectives are the objectives of a man of firm good will and his capacity to move in the direction he has willed may not be questioned. He has twisted, turned and changed his pace often during these ten years but he has never stood still and he has never lost his bearings.

He took office in the midst of the worst financial and economic panic America had ever experienced. He fully understood that the breakdown was caused by the failure of laissez-faire capitalism to distribute the largess of field and factory which science in its agricultural and industrial application had made possible. A revolution in the distributive process was indicated. The question was whether such a revolution could be brought off within the framework of a constitutional system of democratic government designed to function in a simple, even semi-primitive, society. He decided that it could if the Constitution were strained to permit direct government intervention in the fields theretofore regarded as the exclusive preserves of private enterprise. Business, industry and agriculture had to be subjected to some social restraints and purchasing power had to be fed into the system from the bottom. Thus the NRA, the SEC, the WPA, the PWA, the AAA, the TVA, the NLRB and all the rest. The government went into debt to supplement private spending, boost the national income and preserve the constitutional system in modified form. The theory, since proved sound beyond question, was that over-all income could be so increased under government stimulation that the national debt could be liquidated by skimming off the economic increment.

To achieve all this, the President reached out for the support of the unemployed who benefited from the WPA and the PWA, farmers who were saved by the AAA, small business men who benefited from both relief and crop-subsidy payments, and workers who were given a chance to improve their condition by collective bargaining under the protection of the NLRB as well as traditional Democrats of the Solid South and the urban North. That political combination reëlected him twice. It was strong enough to overcome the forces of conservatism, although these forces remained powerful through continued ownership of the means of production, control over the important media of propaganda and domination of habitual thought patterns. At one point, this minority undertook to obstruct the Roosevelt program by legal blockade. The so-called court-packing bill was the result and, even though defeated, it accomplished its purpose. The Supreme Court moved out of the way and the lower courts were thus neutralized.

But meanwhile Europe and Asia, likewise suffering from depression and maldistribution, had turned to war for the solution of their problems. Roosevelt talked peace and tried to make a contribution to improve world economy by revival of world trade through reciprocal trade agreements. The contribution was too little and too late. The German and Japanese gangsters already were on the loose. When it became apparent that the might of America would have to be thrown into the fight against them if they were to be stopped, Roosevelt called into play some of the same ingenuity he had previously applied to the problem of circumventing the archaic Constitution to get things done at home. He persuaded Congress to modify the neutrality laws which had grown out of disillusionment following the First World War, to permit sale of war materials to Great Britain. He traded warships for island naval bases. He built up the armed forces of the United States. He gradually clamped down economic sanctions on Japan.

When war came, the New Deal's economic pump-priming became not supplemental but the nation's principal source of income. But it was spent by private enterprisers turned into war industrialists. As America's paymasters, the reactionaries won back much of the political power they had previously lost. Roosevelt was forced to reverse his economic policies—to impose restraints against inflation such as rationing, heavy taxation and price control rather than continue to feed out purchasing power to combat deflation. He lost farm support; prosperous workers became indifferent; big business men were intent on cashing in.

That is where matters stand on the President's sixty-first birthday. He has organized the nation for war. He wants to preserve full employment at home after the war and create safeguards against future wars abroad. His career up to now has been practice for this. If he succeeds, he will be forever one of the world's greatest figures. In himself he has the equipment to succeed; in his people may lie the weakness for his undoing.

Washington T. R. B.

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What Artists and What Victory

THE MOST REMARKABLE THING about the largest show of contemporary American art in years, now at the Metropolitan Museum and called "Artists for Victory," is its uncovering of all the forces which so long have discolored artistic expression in this country. Here is an exhibit to which eight thousand oil paintings alone were sent and for which $52,000 was spent in prize money, and it hasn't one significant oil painting in it. Yet this was not only an open competition, but also a selective one—that is, the jury could ask for any other painting by an artist whose work had been accepted if the jury thought there existed a better painting by that artist. This should have been insurance of a fine show. The truth is that many artists were represented by inferior works, and that many of our finest artists weren't represented at all (Horace Pippen, John Marin, Georgia O'Keeffe, Milton Avery, Walt Kuhn, Arthur Dove, Walter Houmère, Karl Knaths, Herman Maril, Morris Kantor, Karl Fortess). It may be true that some of these artists didn't enter the show, but for both failings the jury must be held largely responsible, the same kind of jury which year after year limits and stultifies shows by its own conservative taste. As a result the show looks like a defense of all the worst aspects of academicism of the last fifty years.

The jury on awards shows to even worse advantage. It was composed of the heads of museums in the East, people who have already had enormous power in setting the tone of accepted American art. Their selections are like the ghosts of former prize-winners gathered together for one last vindication. Albright's painting of a mortuary door won the 1941 Chicago Annual, Curry's indifferently sprawling Wisconsin farm with its gelatine sky won the Pennsylvania Academy's award in 1941, "South of Scranton" by Peter Blume came all the way back from the 1934 Carnegie International, and the rest of the awards read like a roll-call of prize-winning artists of the last few years. I should like explained to me in what consists the superiority of the Curry landscape over the Weber hanging beside it.

Further, an exhibit which calls itself "Artists for Victory," or an artists' symbol of what we are fighting for, and at the same time restricts competitors to citizens of the United States, is a shameful contradiction of itself. This is not only unfair (it disqualified so famous an American artist as Yasuo Kuniyoshi, president of The American Group) but ludicrous, since there are in the United States now exiled artists who refused to live in their native countries under the enemy we are fighting, and who are such masters they have already made art history—such artists, for instance, as Chagall, Lipchitz, Masson, Ernst. And at a time when there is such need of Pan-Americanism, the exhibit was closed to artists like the Mexican Rivera, Orozco, the Chilean Matta, the Canadian Harris, the Brazilian Martins, Portinari. The responsibility for this lies with the graybeard organizations (National Academy of Design, Artists' Professional League, National Sculpture Society, Alumni Association of the American Academy in Rome, for example) within the huge and diffuse one called "Artists for Victory," which exploited a stipulation in the Hearn Fund that the prize money was to be bestowed only on Americans. The fact that the foreign-born artists could have exhibited without competing for awards (some such exclusion occurs in almost all exhibits for one reason or another) was ignored—though not forgotten; for at the same time these artists were excluded from the present show a ruling was made that they should not be from later ones.

Finally in a show of such size and would-be comprehensiveness, the practice of accepting more than one picture from any one artist is distinctly out of place. In view of the fact that some eight thousand artists tried to be represented in the show, it is especially distasteful to see the quality of some of the artists who were allowed two pictures.

As to what *is* in the show, I saw little that seemed of much lasting value. Max Weber's "Musical Interlude" perhaps comes closest, though it is not his best work; Ivan Albright's "That Which I Should Have Done I Did Not Do" certainly achieves in its cold and elegant linear form much of the poignancy of the moment never to be reclaimed; Julian Levi's "Last of the Lighthouse" has distinction and feeling; the Niles Spencer "Waterfront Mill" is again a virile, cardboard replica of New York and again excellently organized. There are others worth seeing—Burlin, Ribak, Howard, Berg, Mechau. In spite of these and some others, the colossus of the mediocre has possession of this show.

MANNY FARBER

The Bandwagon

"Isn't it true that you are aligning yourself with the Japanese—isn't that what you mean by 'we'?" Mr. Sonnett asked.

"It is hard for a man not versed in English to differentiate between 'we' and the Japanese," Jordan said. – *From the trial of Robert Leonard Jordan for sedition, as reported in The New York Times.*

The reason for the 38-year-old draft limit is that Roosevelt (with four sons in the armed forces) nevertheless has a 38-year-old friend he wants to keep out of the army.

When the government talks about freezing men in their jobs it means they're going to turn off all the heat in the factories. – *From Gallup's American Institute of Public Opinion's survey on rumors, released by Public Opinion News Service.*

Clean and Decent Dancing Every Night Except Sunday. – *Advertisement in the Lake Mills News, Lake Mills, Louisiana.*

More Than Likely

The jury will have Flynn's career in its hands. If he is vindicated, his popularity may increase. If he is found guilty, he faces a maximum of 50 years in prison and probably professional ruin. – *From The Chicago Sun.*

Total-War Department

German Propaganda Minister Goebbels, who has been trying to whip up German war energy by chilling the blood of radio listeners, threatened a new Allied atrocity yesterday if they fail to win the war, says United Press. He warned they would be forced to learn English and that English spelling is very difficult. – *From The New York Mirror.*

Our readers are invited to contribute to this column; $1 will be paid for each item used. Address Bandwagon, care of The New Republic. Please enclose the original clipping. – THE EDITORS

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Correspondence

A National Government?

SIR: We all profess to believe that the war, and the peace for which we are waging war, are issues of such vital importance that they should be raised above the level of party politics. The natural consequence would be to form, as in Great Britain, a national government to meet the national emergency.

If, forgetting hoary conventions, we take a realistic view of the situation, we find, first of all, that we already have a coalition government of the British type, since two important Cabinet positions, as well as important ambassadorships, have been given to Republicans.

We find also that all effective action in this Congress will have in fact to be non-partisan. Democrats and Republicans are so evenly matched that there is no secure majority to carry out a strictly partisan program. No important measure can be passed without the consent of the opposition, which therefore must cease to be considered as an "opposition."

If we choose to retain the partisan labels, the Democrats, still nominally in power, are bound to suffer heavily, and, I submit, unjustly. For the Republicans will vote for all the essential war measures, and claim credit for their patriotism; but the Democrats alone will be blamed for the discomforts inevitably arising out of these measures. By 1944, we shall be fed up with restrictions and regulations. Our discontent, if it be allowed to take a political form, will lead to a reaction which may engulf the Democratic Party, the New Deal, and with them much of our recent social progress.

Again, if the administration remains nominally in the hands of the Democrats, the Republicans will be sorely tempted to make party capital out of any peace settlement that may be proposed: the one sacred principle in party politics being that the other side is inevitably wrong. Now, as President Roosevelt and Vice President Wallace are obviously committed to world organization, it is strictly possible that the Republicans may urge an immediate return to rugged individualism, *i. e.*, isolation or *sacro egoismo* in international affairs.

Unless—and the result would be hardly less dangerous—the Democrats should attempt to forestall such a move by favoring a peace settlement so cautious, so "realistic" that it could not be used against them at home. Such a compromise would of course be heartily welcome by the more conservative elements among our allies. Once more, the "starry-eyed boys" would be unceremoniously pushed aside. A wise peace settlement will require courage; and a party in fear of its rival cannot be courageous.

For all these reasons, I suggest that we keep the war and the peace out of politics; and as the war cannot be suspended, the proper way is to suspend party strife now.

There is nothing unrealistic about such a proposal. We are told that the bi-partisan system is essential to the proper working of free institutions. But England, Mother of Parliaments, has had coalition Cabinets for the last fifty years. The last war was waged, the present war is conducted, by such coalitions; and the cautious London Times urged that this method of government be continued over the transition and reconstruction periods. France won in 1914-18 because there was a Sacred Union, and fell in 1940 because there was none.

A coalition government is not an irresponsible autocracy. We are apt to confound the evil of partisan denigration ("smearing") with the stimulus of non-partisan criticism. I can hardly imagine Mr. Herbert Hoover or Mr. Wendell Willkie failing to speak out their minds, even though there should be two or three more Republicans in the national Cabinet.

We may be told that the bi-partisan system is with us a "sacred tradition." Perhaps we might remember that the Founders denounced parties, which they properly called *factions*.

When the present emergency is over, it may be desirable that party lines be drawn again. When this happens, let us trust it will be on intelligible lines—Standpatters v. Progressives; Opportunists v. Radicals—and not according to the present crazy pattern.

I know that machine politicians will shrug their shoulders at such a proposal. It is not practical politics, since it would take away their occupation. But it does not appear that America has any great love or respect for machine politicians.

Now is the time for all good men to come to the aid of their country.

New York City ALBERT GUÉRARD

Indoctrination after the War

SIR: Most of us recognize that one of the most powerful secret weapons in Hitler's hands was the Nazi indoctrination of German youth. It is equally clear that no permanent peace can be maintained unless some supervision of civic education is exercised over the children of all nations. To this end I would like to propose that as a part of the peace plans the United Nations establish three educational committees.

The function of the first committee would be to appraise the products of various educational media—nursery rhymes, children's stories, popular songs, light operas, radio, movies, schools, clubs, etc.—in so far as the material presented had bearing upon the child's growing concept of his own role as a part of a social hierarchy.

The second committee would be composed of educators, psychologists, cultural anthropologists, *et al.*, and it would be their function to corral in each nation experts of every educational medium to stimulate the production of material which would enable the child to evalute himself as an individual and as an integral part of the world order. The purpose would not be to destroy national cultures but to determine in what way the national culture could be utilized to develop a broader concept of the child's position as a member of the family, as a part of a nation, and as a member of the United Nations. Youth of all countries have learned today that their obligation to a larger group—the state—can during crisis take precedence over their obligations to family or to themselves as individuals. This is our opportunity to teach that obligation to the United Nations can, under circumstances, take precedence over their obligations to their own nation.

The function of the third committee—composed not only of educators, philosophers, etc., but of international lawyers as well—would be to judge when and if the activities of the first two committees infringed upon academic freedom or national cultural rights.

More feasible plans are undoubtedly conceivable. But I do hope the press of the country will get behind the proposal of Vice President Wallace that some supervision of international education of children be maintained so that an incorporation of some such provisions into the peace treaty will not seem inappropriate.

New York City MYRTLE B. MCGRAW

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Radio Razzberry, Cont'd.

SIR: I am thankful to see that you are publishing letters of indignant protest against the sickening radio advertising which makes us dread the turning on of so many of the programs which we would like to hear. The worst horror is probably the "modern design" of Pall Mall cigarettes with the tedious repetitive acclaim of Lucky Strikes a close second.

I believe, however, that the most pernicious radio advertising is the endless and blatant praise of various laxative medicines. In the interest of public health, why is this dangerous and persistent advertising permitted, since even the government warns against the use of such drugs?

Palo Alto, Calif. G. T. W. PATRICK

Mr. Straight and Burma

SIR: "The Filipinos despise the Americans and the restoration of American rule brought about by General MacArthur to them would be a repulsive prospect. We British have one chance in the Philippines: to place our offensive under a Russian general with predominantly British troops and to prepare an offensive with the most intensive political warfare based on the most explicit promise of self-government at once."

What does this mean? Nonsense, of course; and utterly untrue. But what would an American feel if he read this by a distinguished English journalist in a responsible English review?

Yet in your issue of January 4 Michael Straight wrote what is equally ridiculous, equally false and offensive to English readers as follows:

> The Burmese despise the British, and the restoration of British rule brought about by General Wavell to them would be a repulsive prospect. We (Americans) have one chance in Burma: to place our offensive under a Chinese general with predominantly American aid, etc.

If Mr. Straight's diagnosis were accurate it would still be injudicious to print it. As it is false, it is outrageous. It is the patriotic duty of all citizens of the United Nations to think and say the best they can of their allies. Mr. Straight in writing this sort of thing is doing Goebbels' work for him.

ERIC UNDERWOOD

San Francisco, Calif.

[Mr. Underwood apparently chooses to misunderstand plain English. The word "American" which he places in parentheses does not appear in Mr. Straight's text. It was perfectly clear that the word "we" referred to the United Nations, not to the Americans. Mr. Underwood also takes two sentences which were widely separated in the text and quotes them as though they were contiguous. There is plenty of evidence that Mr. Straight's remarks about the attitude of the Burmese are true. The present serious difficulties of the British expedition floundering along the coast of Burma toward Akyab reinforces the suggestion that an army predominantly Chinese, adequately equipped and attacking from the north, would have the best chance of retaking Burma.

We resist as strongly as possible Mr. Underwood's proposal on "patriotic" grounds to suppress all criticism of one ally by another in wartime. This is a very dangerous fallacy. Mr. Underwood's compatriots in London are violating his rule in attacking the American State Department for its policy in North Africa, and we rejoice that this is so. Clamping down a censorship such as Mr. Underwood wants would be a good guarantee that we would lose both the war and the peace. Incidentally, Mr. Underwood's hypersensitivity caused him to assume that Mr. Straight was criticizing the British, whereas in fact he was talking about United Nations policy for which this country bears a heavy share of responsibility. – THE EDITORS]

From The New Republic Mail Bag

E. P. Osgood, of Reno, Nevada, thinks liberals are making a mistake in paying so much attention to the Beveridge Plan and similar panaceas. He says our present economic system, with its vast burden of debts and profits, and its monopolistic practices, is unworkable and that what we want is a strong program, demanding a government that will maintain permanently the full buying power of the population.

Miss Minnie Elizabeth Allen of Ames, Iowa, writes to express approval of the editorial "Report to the Front" in the December 28, 1942, issue. "I hope you will keep it up; it fills a definite need. I wish it could reach, in hundreds of thousands of copies, not only our soldiers and sailors at the front but all those who are still here in the training camps."

The Michigan Manpower Mobilization Corps sends us a pamphlet describing the organization and the work of this group of University of Michigan students. It has enlisted some 2,000 men and women on the campus to form a labor reservoir for war work in the university area. The project was initiated by campus leaders and supported by the university newspaper, The Michigan Daily. The corps has helped out in hundreds of projects from picking sugar beets to supplying workers in regular shifts in nearby defense factories. This project, as described in the pamphlet, seems to furnish an efficient model for the organization of students who desire to contribute actual labor to the war effort.

From Helen V. Paul of Chicago comes appreciation of Varian Fry's recent article on the political background of France. "Too bad," she writes, "that some of our metropolitan papers cannot give that sort of stuff to their readers. Did you notice Westbrook Pegler's editorial on the same subject (not the same treatment) the same week?" We noticed it.

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Books in Review

Ferrero in Washington

LET ME REPORT a quite imaginary conversation between an official of the State Department and a left-wing journalist. It began at an imaginary cocktail party in Chevy Chase, it continued at an imaginary restaurant on Connecticut Avenue, and it ended without the two men's coming to even imaginary blows. They belonged at opposite corners of the political earth and yet they had something in common: a sort of battered hopefulness, a belief that the world could be made better, but very slowly, without much help from professional idealists and with many turns for the worse.

"We saw it all coming," said the man from the State Department. "From the moment when the Japanese army marched into Manchuria, our men warned us that there would be a war in the Pacific. From the moment when Goering burned the Reichstag, they warned us that there would be another big war in Europe. We did what we could to stop it, but we simply hadn't the power." He emptied his glass. "This is the first night in a week that I haven't gone back to my desk. Come out and have dinner with me, you subversive element, you damned Bolshevik." And he took the journalist's arm.

"We saw it all coming," he said again in the taxi. "We watched Hitler build up his army and knew he was going to use it. We knew that Chamberlain would yield everything for the sake of keeping peace, and then not keep the peace. We knew that Germany would attack Russia—we even knew the day—and we knew that the Russian army was stronger than Hitler supposed, being better informed than our general staff. We warned the army and navy that the Japanese were going to attack at several points in the Pacific, but they wouldn't believe us, any more than Stalin believed us when we told him five months in advance about the German invasion. I had a strange feeling sometimes, as if I were watching an express train moving at top speed toward an open drawbridge while I shouted at the top of my lungs, and nobody would listen."

"I didn't hear you shout," said the left-wing journalist. By that time they were ordering dinner.

"It's true that the State Department doesn't raise its voice," said the official, "but we issued solemn warnings. That was all we could do, for our hands were tied. The public simply couldn't believe there would be a war or that the United States would be involved in it no matter how hard we tried to keep out. Congress wouldn't give us power to help our friends or hinder our enemies. We couldn't threaten or promise; we couldn't even say, 'If you cross that line the United States will fight.' And yet we did what we could—we hinted at help that would be forthcoming, we hinted at what would probably happen to the Fascists if they attacked, we kept our friends in line, we frightened our enemies. When the real story of this war is written—when the people know how close Britain came to utter defeat, and what that would have meant to us, and just what the State Department did in Vichy, in Madrid, in Belgrade, in Ankara, in North Africa—then the smart boys who abused us will have to change their tune. The Germans and the Italians don't think we're just cookie-pushers."

"I know that you people never got credit for half the clever moves you made," said the left-wing journalist. "But I can't see much sense in some of the moves you are making now—Darlan, I mean, and Otto of Hapsburg, and these rumors about the Crown Prince of Italy."

"Wait and see," the official said, looking as mysterious as anybody could while cracking the claw of a lobster. "Some of the rumors are that and nothing more. But for general policy I can give you one clue. Did you happen to read Ferrero's last book, 'The Principles of Power'?[1] Yes? It's not a great book, as you will doubtless agree, but it contains one profound idea: that a legitimate government is the only one one that does not fear its own people, who in turn do not fear the government. 'Freedom from fear,' said the President, and legitimacy is the best way to achieve it."

The official waved a lobster claw as if he were a magician waving his wand or a king flourishing his sceptre.

Next morning, the left-wing journalist woke with a mild hangover and began to reflect on what he had heard. Here was a key to many State Department policies that puzzled him—why Pétain was regarded as a legitimate ruler, why Darlan was honored as his deputy, why the kings in exile were treated as if they ruled vast nations, and why the Ambassador to Spain promised we would never make a move to change that country's government. It was now considered to be a legitimate government, even if it owed its existence to Hitler and Mussolini; even if it offered public prayers for their triumph and stood opposed to every principle for which we were said to be fighting. For the State Department, the war against Hitler was part of a greater war against anarchy and violent revolution.

The journalist sat down to write his new friend a letter, feeling that it would have no effect, but wishing to clear his own mind. "Besides the sound objections that historians have already made to Ferrero's thesis . . . "

"It sounds stuffy," he said to himself, "but since I won't mail it anyway, it doesn't matter."

". . . there are two dangers in the State Department's fashion of applying it. First, there is the likelihood that legitimacy will be confused with legalism or with simple conservatism, especially when so many of our career diplomats are friends of the conservatives abroad. But the second danger in the doctrine of legitimacy seems to me even more important at this moment. It is, put briefly, that the doctrine might be used to prevent even the most necessary reorganization of Europe and the world.

"Ferrero in his book seems to take for granted the complete independence of every European nation great and small. But the fact was that many of them had never been independent, while others had lost their freedom of action long before the war. They could not take a single step in foreign policy without the consent of Britain or France, and

[1] G. P. Putnam's Sons, $3.50. "The Principles of Power" was reviewed at length by Sidney Hook in the October 19 issue.

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later Germany or Russia. Their armies were meaningless and irrelevant. For their people, the right to be citizens of a technically free country without wealth or markets had become an intolerable burden.

"I am not thinking merely of little states on the Baltic or in the Balkans. Even Poland, with its thirty million people whom we have learned to recognize as the bravest in the world and the most patriotic (although some of them are Ukrainian, not Polish, patriots)—even Poland with its coal mines and steel mills and its army of two millions had to be supported by Germany or Russia; she could not stand for six weeks by herself. Since her fall, still larger nations, including France and Italy, have lost their independence. There are only five Great Powers in the world today, and two of them are going to be defeated.

"Among all the revolutions that people like to discuss over cocktails, there is one that has already taken place: the anti-national revolution, the effective disappearance of the small sovereign states. How does this agree with the principle of legitimacy? And what does your Department plan to do about it after the war? Does it plan to send heralds through Europe, blowing trumpets and summoning the dead states to rise again? Does it hope to restore all the circumstances that produced the present war, but with a sufficient structure of treaties and documents so that an already successful revolution will be swathed in paper and put to sleep with protocol? Does Sumner Welles intend to be the Metternich of the twentieth century? If that is his plan, we shall lose the peace indeed, and we can hardly expect to win another war." MALCOLM COWLEY

Rather Funny

A Treasury of British Humor, edited by Morris Bishop. New York: Coward-McCann. 820 pages. $3.

MR. BISHOP reveals himself here as a very good anthologist, which makes one wonder why "A Treasury of British Humor" is not a particularly satisfying anthology. The two statements are perhaps not so contradictory as they sound, nor is the explanation so difficult as it might be. Mr. Bishop has taste and judgment; he is widely read in his subject; he really knows what he likes, and he likes a good many kinds of things. He is anything but slavish in his choices, and yet anything but eccentric. If he includes, on principle, very little that is too well known, even less does he include things simply because they are not known at all.

If the result is not altogether rewarding, it is not, then, because somebody else could have done a notably better job. Neither is it because the English haven't produced enough funny things to fill a large-sized book. They have produced enough to fill a small library. Nor is it that their humor does not "travel" or is ill suited to American tastes. The answer, I think, is that not enough of the best English humor can be snagged on the run. The best English humor does not lie like so many apples in a barrel; it lies like great slabs of beef, in whole novels and extensive characterizations. The funniest things in English literature are its people: Falstaff, Mrs. Slipslop, Uncle Toby, the Brangtons, Mr. Collins, Miss Bates, Micawber, the Wellers, and so on. These are, indeed, among the great preservatives of English fiction, but it is hard to prove the point with dabs and

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samples; an act or utterance of theirs, even perhaps their best scenes and sayings, need the whole book behind them. The same thing, in a less conspicuous degree, is true of the English portrayal of manners: in isolated passages the humor seems fitful and half-buried, the satire seems too unsustained or too obvious; it is only in its complete form that a novel of Fielding's or Thackeray's (as Mr. Bishop is the first to admit) can hit off the faults and follies of a whole society. There is, finally, that truth about humor which is all too well known in theory, but which every anthology of it ignores in practice: the unsatisfactoriness of serving it up cold. We can appreciate wit instantly—we can hardly appreciate it in any other way; but humor needs background. Most of it is long in developing, and most anthologies are short on space.

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The Idiot of *Dostoevsky*, by R. P. Blackmur
The Writing of Edmund Wilson, by Delmore Schwartz
An Examination of Wallace Stevens, by Horace Gregory
The Poetry of Marianne Moore, by Kenneth Burke

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Confidence Africaine, by Roger Martin du Gard

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Proust's Account of the Fall of France, by E. B. Burgum
Modern Forms of Primitivism, by Harry Slochower

HISTORY:
Slaughter of the Witnesses, by John Dos Passos

BIBLIOGRAPHY:
American Poetry: 1930-1940, by the editors aided by R. P. Blackmur, H. Gregory, J. Holmes, M. D. Zabel.

Stories by: Richard Sullivan, James Farrell, Meyer Levin, Ernest Brace, Wilma Shore, Helen Eustis, Ben Field, etc.

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These seem to me to be some of the reasons why "A Treasury of British Humor" is far from continuously funny. A great deal of it is necessarily made up of the minor forms of English humor, which lack robustness: urbane little pieces, whimsical trifles, neat little squibs, various boutonnieres. These are often of very good quality; they are even the things best suited to an anthology; but they do not exhilarate in the same degree that they divert. I must confess to having got a good deal more enjoyment, on the whole, from Mr. Bishop's contemporary selections than from his earlier ones, and not because there was intrinsically so much more to enjoy. But it would be a fraud to maintain that, short of the absolutely first-rate in humor, we chiefly react on the basis of quality. We react in terms of existing modes of sophistication, and of our interest in the subject matter and our nearness to it. Fifty years hence a piece about a mischievous British censor will fall flat enough; right now it is very good fun. The old boys, on the other hand, however great of name or firm of touch, are seldom very entertaining in their occasional pieces; while their nonsense too often has something skittish about it.

Not that with a little searching you won't find much that *is* satisfying in this book, and some things that are delightful. Have a look, for example, at what Mr. Bishop has taken from E. F. Benson, or Chesterton, or John Collier, or Dunsany, or Coppard, or Herbert Farjeon; these, and other things as good, will certainly repay you. Among the moderns, one might ask for E. M. Forster's piece on the bicentenary of his death, or for Maurice Richardson's howling account of an aged peer's maiden speech. Of the traditional humorists, Sterne and Lamb are omitted because Mr. Bishop can't stomach them; Fielding, because it is impossible to make a satisfactory excerpt; Smollett, I presume, because he is too harsh; Goldsmith, Fanny Burney and Peacock for reasons not given. I think Mr. Bishop might have done better by Max Beerbohm and Evelyn Waugh, and perhaps by Johnson and Burns. But his lapses are few and are anyhow matters of taste. The book may fall short of the highest requirements for a handpicked library; but I have to admit it does fine for reading in bed. LOUIS KRONENBERGER

New Distinction

The Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna, recorded by M. Translated. Introduction by Swami Nikhilananda. New York: Ramakrishna-Vivekananda Center. 1,088 pages. $7.50.

FOR THIS EXTRAORDINARY BOOK Aldous Huxley has written a foreword that in a brief news-announcement like this should merely be quoted in its entirety, so right is its placement of the record, thus presented in the realm of mystical thought, historical Indian religion, and our Western relation to the whole matter. Certainly this is one of the notable books of our time, one of the marvelous books in all time. It is a book where gentle, deathless goodness softens what humiliation I might feel for any inadvertent glibness of comment; and where the piety—in the deepest Latin sense of the word—and the brilliant, easy scholarship of the translation into English is enough to knock us down. The subject himself is, of course, no new figure. Ramakrishna has long been in the thoughts of Western scholars from Max Müller to Bergson. Professor Irwin Edman has said

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that readers of this book will have a new dimension added to their religious life.

"The Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna" may be said to be a very nearly unique instance of biography, or record, in the famous, rare Boswell vein but infinitely more lucent and inspired, of a remarkable man whose genius most appeared in direct communication, which is to say in talk with disciples and friends. M., the disciple and note-taker, remains a shadow. The picture of Sri Ramakrishna (1836-86) is amazingly, and sometimes disconcertingly for the Western mind, complete. Sri Ramakrishna is not only one of the complete cases of mysticism and hagiography that we possess for laboratory purposes, so to speak; he is also one of the animating spirits of the national consciousness of India today. It might be easily possible that "The Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna" should be the most important book of the year for Western readers, if only for the practical reason that our understanding of the Indian mind is destined to be a more and more pressing matter. STARK YOUNG

Haushoferism

THE CURRENT VOGUE OF GEOPOLITICS has called forth three new books devoted to the ideas of Karl Haushofer and his school.[1] The various authors approach the subject from divergent points of view and with varying degrees of insight and objectivity, but they have one common virtue: they demonstrate the falseness of the widely held belief that Haushofer is *the* great geopolitician, if not the founder of that study. In all three books the debt of Haushofer to Ratzel, Mackinder and Kjellén is shown, but none of them seems to go far enough in showing how much he borrowed. If one compares Haushofer's works with Mackinder's "Democratic Ideals and Reality," it appears that the German's fresh contribution is surprisingly small. He is a popularizer who has debased geopolitics to the level of highfalutin expansionist propaganda; he seems to have taken over the ideas of his predecessors without adding a single valid concept of his own. Haushofer's imperialism is most evident in his "dynamic" concept of the frontier: a boundary is not a fixed line, but the skin of an organism which tends to expand to infinity, like the frontiers of Lucretius' universe. Following the German Romanticists and Kjellén, Haushofer thinks of the state as a biological organism, but few will consider this position an advance beyond Mackinder's. Of course Haushofer is a learned man and in some ways an extremely intelligent one. Individual statements of his have a prophetic ring today. Thus he anticipated the rapid fall of France and pointed out that the guns at Singapore faced the wrong way. In 1929 he described Pearl Harbor as a mousetrap. In a sense there are two Haushofers; at times he writes with notable moderation and objectivity, but more often his violent chauvinism distorts his considerable intelligence. He is brilliant though very erratic in his judgments of

[1] The World of General Haushofer, by Andreas Dorpalen. New York: Farrar and Rinehart. 377 pages. $3.50.

Generals and Geographers: The Twilight of Geopolitics, by Hans W. Weigert. New York: The Oxford University Press. 273 pages. $3.

German Strategy of World Conquest, by Derwent Whittlesey, with the collaboration of Charles C. Colby and Richard S. Hartshorne. New York: Farrar and Rinehart. 293 pages. $2.50.

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strategic situations; to the study of geopolitics as a whole his main contributions have been fanatic nationalism, a grim "Prussian" romanticism and an execrable style.

The popular belief that Haushofer is the "brains behind Hitler" is also in large part a mistaken one. One has merely to compare Haushofer's doctrines with Chapter XIV of "Mein Kampf" to see how sharp the opposition is. Haushofer is an apparently sincere admirer of Japan and has tremendous respect for the power of Russia; he was opposed to a military understanding with Italy and wished to ally Germany with the "colored" colonial peoples, believing that the British Empire was doomed. (The occasional racist remarks in Haushofer seem to have been inserted as protective coloring.) Hitler's original views were exactly the opposite. The alliance with Japan may mean that Haushofer's influence has modified Hitler's racist beliefs; more likely it is a matter of political expedience. After the Russo-German pact Haushofer's reputation rose dramatically, and Weigert speaks of the pseudo-alliance as a "triumph of Haushoferism." Perhaps it was, but there is no evidence that the influence of the geopoliticians was decisive. A strong faction in the Reichswehr had long favored an understanding with Russia, and Hitler himself was perfectly aware of the danger of fighting on two major fronts at once. To be sure, Haushofer and Hitler agree on the necessity of German expansion, the desirability of war, and the need for a large peasant population as the basis of state power, but such doctrines are the stock in trade of all fascist publicists. The Institute for Geopolitics is only one of the many organs of planning and propaganda within the Nazi framework; it supplies some of the "brains" of German imperialism, but it is by no means dominant.

Mr. Dorpalen's book seems to me the most enlightening and incisive study which has appeared on this subject. Dorpalen obviously dislikes Haushofer and all his works, but his approach is that of exposition and rational analysis; he does not reiterate his moral indignation. He lets the geopoliticians speak for themselves; the lengthy selections from Ratzel, Mackinder, Haushofer and the others form the most valuable part of the book. To say this is not to detract from Dorpalen's critical observations, which are often acute. His treatment of the theory of the organic state is refreshingly skeptical, as is his questioning of the axiom that the "heartland" (Siberia and eastern Russia) is the pivot of history. Some of his comments on the military situation are already dated; they were obviously written at a time when the Axis still held the initiative. In his conclusion Dorpalen emphasizes and perhaps overstresses Haushofer's neglect of sea power, a neglect which he considers the greatest weakness of German strategy as a whole. Another aspect of the present situation is less debatable: it has been on land, in the Russian "heartland" itself, that Germany has met her worst reverses.

"Generals and Geographers" is frankly a political book: Mr. Weigert's main purpose is to show Americans the usefulness of Haushofer's method as well as the viciousness of his ethics. About Haushofer himself the author seems a bit ambivalent. While he makes clear the character of Haushofer's imperialism, shows his mistakes and points out his great debt to Mackinder, he states nevertheless that the Germans were "blessed by such a national genius as Karl Haushofer." Weigert seems to mean that the Major General-Professor is a genius in influencing public opinion, and one who managed to impart a sense of global strategy to some of the German elite. No doubt he is a "genius" in this sense, but how dubious the blessing! As Weigert shows, Haushofer is in part to blame for one of the gravest blunders of German strategy: the almost incredible underestimation of the power and influence of the United States. The author is at his best in showing Haushofer's relation to two powerful tendencies in German nationalism: the sense of collective claustrophobia which found expression in the demand for *Lebensraum*, and the persistently romantic attitude toward war and conquest. Weigert is an admirer of Spengler and is himself prone to generalize about "the German soul" and "the Western and the Eastern mind." In his description of the Bavarian revolution of 1918 Weigert shows a distinct conservative bias; but despite this, he warns the Western powers against a peace negotiated with aristocratic elements in the German army. He concludes his book with a strong plea for a "humanized geopolitics," that is, a study of geographical realities which does not ignore ethics.

Mr. Whittlesey's book is not devoted to geopolitics alone but includes a rather brief discussion of the roots of the Nazi program. This is of course a logical approach, but the results in this case are unfortunate. His study of the philosophical background of Nazism begins with Immanuel Kant. By the adroit selection of three statements from his writings he manages to imply that Kant was a sort of proto-fascist, one who "provided a cogent philosophical justification for the military aggressiveness which Germany [meaning Prussia?] had been displaying all along. . . ." Such inconvenient facts as Kant's vindication of Christian ethics in "The Critique of Practical Reason" and his authorship of the treatise "Towards Eternal Peace" are naturally ignored. By just such methods the more reckless Nazi "scholars" are able to claim that Goethe and Schiller were forerunners of Hitlerism. It is significant that Whittlesey cites the relatively inoffensive Friedrich Schlegel as a dangerous nationalist, while he ignores completely all the non-German ancestors of fascism; neither Gobineau nor H. S. Chamberlain is mentioned. Similarly, he implies that universal military conscription was a German invention and that the German states have been the chief disturbers of the peace "for the last several centuries." One seems to remember that the aggressions of the early Hohenzollerns were rather small potatoes compared with those of Louis XIV. This Hun-baiting is particularly regrettable, for the bulk of the work is concerned with Haushofer and his school and contains a great deal of useful material, with many quotations from geopolitical literature. There is an impressive bibliography, and the discussion of geopolitical maps is the best I have seen anywhere, with numerous reproductions, and explanations of the symbols used. (Haushofer's maps are potent weapons of propaganda; far more vivid than Mackinder's, they generally serve some specific imperialist purpose.) To the extent that Whittlesey and his collaborators confine themselves to geopolitics their contribution is valuable. The ideal procedure would be to study Dorpalen's text and Whittlesey's maps.

Undoubtedly there are truths in geopolitics which nations must learn if they are to survive. The influence of land masses on history, the artificiality of our division of

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the world into continents, the strategical implications of the shape of the earth—all these will bear repetition. The difficulty is of course that geopolitics by its very nature tends to assume a nationalistic point of view. Even Mackinder, a humane and moderate person, writes as one who is first of all an Englishman. As Haushofer remarked, there is a German geopolitics, an English geopolitics, and so on; and Weigert warns against the hard-boiled American school now emerging. Obviously, geopolitics must first of all be purged of Haushoferism if it is to become a reputable study. Another weakness of the school is its tendency to underrate industrial strength in estimating the power of a nation. Like Haushofer, Mackinder relegates the Americas to a secondary position, since they are far from the "heartland." It might be well to require a thorough course in economics of all fledgling geopoliticians. Above all: unless the study is taken over by men of good will and with an international point of view, it will continue to furnish guide-books for bigger and better wars.

HENRY C. HATFIELD

Mr. Cooper Fights Abroad

Barriers Down, by Kent Cooper. New York: Farrar and Rinehart. 324 pages. $3.

KENT COOPER has been with the Associated Press for many years; he is now its general manager, the top working officer of the association. For nearly three decades one of his major interests has been the effort to break the shackles which foreign governments impose on the transmission of news.

On the whole, the tide of history has been against him, especially in Europe. In the past two decades he has seen all private news sources liquidated in Russia, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the countries heavily influenced or actually occupied by any of these powers. Even the democracies, in wartime, put a heavy burden of control on news, whether exported, imported or domestic. In spite of this, Mr. Cooper has some substantial achievements to record, particularly in breaking the grip of Reuters, the British service, on news transmitted to the United States, and in the creation of genuine competition, at least temporarily, in South America and (before the war) in Japan.

When this conflict is over, if it ends with a United Nations victory, there will be two powerful currents: one, in the direction of freedom, will be motivated by a desire to get away from the totalitarian control of every aspect of life; the other will recognize the fact that even in the democratic countries, government is playing an increasing part in every activity. Whether the sum total of these conflicting tendencies will add up to greater or less press freedom, I don't believe anyone can now predict. It is quite possible that the work of Mr. Cooper and others like him during the years before 1939 will then seem more important than it does now.

At first glance, it seems odd that Mr. Cooper, who so vigorously attacks monopolistic activity abroad, should be so blind to monopolistic practice at home, as represented by the rules of the Associated Press which make it almost impossible for a new paper to obtain a membership; but every psychologist knows how easy it is to compartment one's mind in this way.

B. B.

A Reader's List

THIS IS YOUR ENEMY, by Alvah Bessie (Front Line Fighters' Fund of the International Workers' Order, presented free to anyone contributing 25 cents or more for war relief). Pictures of Nazi atrocities against the Russians, including some of the most ghastly shots of raped women, dismembered children and tortured soldiers ever published. Alvah Bessie's text, based on the Molotov papers, is an excellent job of restrained fury, but the pictures really need no comment or documentation. A book to turn your stomach, but it will make you fighting mad, too.

MIND: Perception and Thought in Their Constructive Aspects, by Paul Schilder (Columbia, $5). The general position taken in this badly written, confusedly organized but nevertheless important book is that the most primitive human experience contains all the different aspects—sensory, perceptual, affective, emotional, motor, intellectual—of more developed experience, although these aspects of primitive experience are not to be mistaken for the "elements" of introspective psychologists. Early sense experience is shown to be decidedly synesthesic. There is an excellent detailed criticism of Pavlovian psychology. In the construction of experience as much emphasis is placed on the vestibular apparatus of the inner ear as on the optic apparatus. It is held that thought processes, and experience as a whole, begin with the general rather than the particular. Much use is made of data derived from abnormal cases. Though the book is sturdily scientific, there is an undertone of criticism of physical science. There is a bibliography of more than four hundred titles, all of which appear to have been used in the text. The book has philosophical as well as psychological significance.

THERE CAME TO VILLE MARIE, by Alan Sullivan (Coward-McCann, $2.50). A more-than-usually competent historical novel about the early days of French Canada, when it was New France. Mr. Sullivan, a Canadian who has written more than thirty novels, knows both his country and the period. The characters, however, are the usual movie types: Paul, the strong, silent farmer, and Jacqueline, the beautiful wife of Jules, a dissatisfied aristocrat (so that when the Indians massacre Jules, you know who gets married). The emphasis is on the great part played by the Church and its martyrs, and the Iroquois, being heathen, are properly shown as red devils and great disembowelers of pregnant women. The book received the Governor-General's Literary Award for the best novel of the year by a Canadian and, at least for exuberant power, may have deserved it.

Contributors

IRVING DILLIARD, one of the first nine Nieman Fellows at Harvard, has been an editorial writer for The St. Louis Post-Dispatch since 1930.

ISAMU NOGUCHI is identified in a footnote to his article on page 142.

D. W. BROGAN is now professor of Political Science at Cambridge and Fellow of Peterhouse. He is the author, among other books, of "The Development of Modern France, 1870-1939." The article in this issue represents solely Professor Brogan's personal views and nothing in it has come from any official source, British or Fighting French.

LOUIS KRONENBERGER's latest book is "Kings and Desperate Men," published last year. He is the drama critic of PM.

HENRY C. HATFIELD is assistant professor of German at Williams College.

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